Arizona

Democratic Party

 

 

Election Integrity Manual

for

County Chairs

 

 

Copyright © 2007 M. A. Duniho

Licensed to the public under the terms

of the Gnu free documentation license

http://www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl.html

Please send comments to Michael A. Duniho

Solutions Arizona LLC

1590 N Saddleback Ave

Tucson, AZ 85715

Phone 520-731-3157

Fax 520-731-3197

Email maduniho@cox.net

 


Arizona Democratic Party

Election Integrity Manual for County Chairs

 

Table of Contents

Chapter                                                                                                                                  

  1. Introduction to Election Systems                                                                                
    1. Components of the elections process

                                                        i.     Voter registration

                                                      ii.     Voter ID

                                                    iii.     Casting the ballot

                                                    iv.     Counting the vote

    1. Party roles and election integrity structure
    2. Risk assessment
  2. Breaches of Election Integrity                                                                        
    1. Bureaucratic problems

                                                    i.     Inadequate physical security

                                                  ii.     Inadequate bookkeeping

                                                iii.     Inadequately trained poll workers

                                                iv.     Lack of transparency

    1. System failures

                                                    i.     Registration errors

                                                  ii.     Ballot errors

                                                iii.     Early voting problems

                                                iv.     Polling place problems

                                                  v.     Counting problems

    1. Vintage intentional methods

                                                    i.     Deny poor people the opportunity to register

                                                  ii.     Purge valid voters from the registration rolls

                                                iii.     Direct voters to the wrong polling places

                                                iv.     Require ID at the polls

                                                  v.     Prepare false early ballot entries

                                                vi.     Stuff the ballot box at the polls

                                              vii.     Render valid ballots unreadable or unacceptable

                                            viii.     Replace batches of valid ballots with fake ones

    1. Modern technological intentional methods

                                                    i.     Program computer to count incorrectly

                                                  ii.     Change the totals in the computer after scanning ballots

                                                iii.     Report fraudulent results from polling places

  1. Your rights and responsibilities                                                                                 
    1. Statutory rights and responsibilities

                                                    i.     Review voter registration lists

                                                  ii.     Conduct logic and accuracy tests

                                                iii.     Appoint Election Board members

                                                iv.     Appoint observers to watch every step of ballot processing

                                                  v.     Randomly select precincts and races to be audited

                                                vi.     Appoint audit workers to hand count some of the ballots

                                              vii.     Supervise the audit

    1. Actions not legally specified but desirable and useful

                                                    i.     Obtain copies of computer logs, election department reports, databases

                                                  ii.     Analyze all the data collected by observers and from the Elections Department

                                                iii.     Ask questions about any procedure that seems incorrect or insecure

  1. People involved in ensuring election integrity                                                           
    1. Election Boards-paid employees of the County elections department

                                                    i.     Accuracy Certification Board

                                                  ii.     Poll workers-Inspectors, Marshals, Judges, Clerks

                                                iii.     Early Boards

                                                iv.     Duplication Boards

                                                  v.     Receiving Boards

                                                vi.     Inspection Boards

                                              vii.     Provisional Boards

                                            viii.     Write-in Boards

                                                 ix.     Audit Board

    1. Election Observers – for every Board
    2. Other election integrity people

                                                    i.     Recruiters

                                                  ii.     Coordinators

                                                iii.     Planners

                                                iv.     Liaisons

                                                  v.     Researchers

  1. Ensuring election integrity at the polls
    1. Voters rights and likely problems
    2. Poll watchers’ limitations
    3. Getting help
    4. Recruiting and training poll watchers                                                                        
  2. Ensuring election security                                                                                          
    1. Security of ballots

                                                    i.     Accounting for ballots printed and delivered to the County

                                                  ii.     Accounting for ballots used

                                                iii.     Accounting for ballots not used

                                                iv.     Transporting ballots from one location to another

                                                  v.     Other chain of custody issues

                                                vi.     Tamper-revealing seals

    1. Security of election machines

                                                    i.     Physical Security

                                                  ii.     Checking the software on the election machines

    1. Security of the central count system

                                                    i.     Early ballot counting computer security

                                                  ii.     Computer audit logs

                                                iii.     Security camera monitoring and logs

                                                iv.     Party observers’ role in maintaining security

    1. Security of vote-total reports printed before the end of Election Day

                                                    i.     Being alert to anything and everything coming out of the printer

                                                  ii.     Sealing early reports and recording seal numbers

                                                iii.     Checking all seal numbers after Election Day

    1. Security of the audit

                                                    i.     Sealing early ballots selected for audit and recording seal numbers

                                                  ii.     Checking all seals after Election Day

                                                iii.     Precinct-level report of votes BEFORE selection of precincts for audit

                                                iv.     Selecting the precincts and races to be audited

                                                  v.     Selecting the early ballots to be audited

                                                vi.     Checking precinct-cast ballot bag tamper-revealing seals

                                              vii.     Checking seals on touch-screen voting machine cartridges

  1. Ensuring election integrity-data collection and analysis                                            
    1. Collecting data

                                                    i.     Recording ballots at every step of the process

                                                  ii.     Recording seal numbers on boxes of ballots

                                                iii.     Recording times

                                                iv.     Recording names of people performing different tasks

                                                  v.     Recording seal numbers used on computers, storage containers, rooms

    1. Analyzing the data

                                                    i.     Comparing numbers of ballots at different stages of the election

                                                  ii.     Comparing seal numbers from different stages of the election

                                                iii.     Looking for odd events (e.g., extra early reports, unneeded database actions)

                                                iv.     Comparing early ballot numbers with precinct-cast ballot numbers

                                                  v.     Checking the database after the election is over

 

Appendix

  1. Arizona Election Day Manual                                                
  2. Consolidated Arizona Election Calendar                                           
  3. Count Chair Election Integrity Checklist
  4. Observer Guidelines
  5. Sample log forms for observers

 

 


1.             Introduction to Election Systems

 

a.                                            Components of the elections process

 

An election is a surprisingly complex process involving many different components, each of which can have an effect on the final outcome.  Each step in the process is a potential source for errors that affect who can vote, what’s on the ballot, and how ballots are counted.  These components include voter registration, ballot design, processing of early mail-in ballots, voter ID check and other paperwork at the polls, casting of votes on voting machines, collecting and tabulating all vote counts from many different machines, and producing reports. 

 

The political parties can play an important role in making sure that these various processes are performed properly.  To do so, it is necessary to understand each of these processes and how they affect the integrity of elections.

 

i.                 Voter Registration

 

In Arizona, as in most states, citizens are required to register specifically to vote. The registration involves telling the voter registrar the citizen’s address so that the registrar can assign the voter to a particular precinct for voting. Sometimes different precincts have different candidates, so this assignment to a precinct is intended to ensure that the voter votes in the correct races, and no others.

 

If a voter moves, he/she must inform the voter registrar so that the voter can be assigned to a new precinct.

 

In Arizona, citizens must prove their citizenship by showing a birth certificate, a passport, naturalization papers, or some form of Indian tribe membership documentation. Since October 1, 1996, a new resident of Arizona applying for a driver’s license or picture ID card who presents the MVD with citizenship proof need not prove citizenship again to the voter registrar, so voter registration can be on-line at the registrar’s web site. Otherwise registration must be in person, with the citizenship proof.

 

Other requirements are that the citizen must have lived in the county at least 29 days before the election – so voter registration for each election is cut off 29 days before the election; must be at least 18 years old on the day of the next general election; must have no felony or treason convictions on the record (unless restored to civil rights); and must not have been labeled by a court as an incapacitated person. [ARS 14-5101]

 

ii.               Voter ID

 

All voters at the polls must positively identify themselves using either an approved picture ID or two approved non-picture IDs. All approved IDs must include the voter’s address, and it must match the address on the registration rolls. Otherwise the voter may only complete a provisional ballot, and must confirm address and ID with the registrar within a few days.

 

Voters who use the mail-in ballots or who vote early at early voting sites are not required to show an ID. Their ballots are verified by their signature on the envelope in which they place their ballot.

 

iii.             Casting the ballot

 

At the polls, a voter will be given a ballot and will be directed to a small portable desk for marking the ballot.  After the ballot is marked, the voter inserts the ballot into the scanner.  To preserve confidentiality, a voter may use a privacy sleeve that prevents anyone from seeing the ballot as it is going into the scanner.

 

Early ballots are generally mailed in, although the voter has the option of casting the early ballot at one of the early voting sites.

 

At either the polls or at an early voting site, a voter may opt to cast a ballot using a touch-screen voting machine.  Although these machines were purchased and are provided primarily for handicapped voters, any voter may use a touch-screen voting machine.

iv.            Counting the vote

 

Votes cast on Election Day at the precincts are counted as they are scanned, and the total for the precinct is sent by telephone modem to the central count facility at the end of the day. Votes cast on a touch-screen voting machine are counted internally by the machine, and the results are fed into the central count computer after Election Day. The paper ballots are sent in a secure container to the central count facility and are retained for six months (non-federal election), or two years (federal election). Precinct-cast ballots from two percent of the precincts in each county are selected for a hand-count audit immediately after the election, to confirm the integrity of the machine count.

 

Early ballots are usually mailed in, and the registrar confirms the identity of the voter by matching the signature on the envelope with the signature on file.  Then the ballot is removed from the envelope and checked to see if it is machine readable.  Wrinkled or improperly marked ballots may be duplicated by a duplication board and the duplicate sent to the scanner in place of the original ballot. Early ballots are scanned at the central count location, usually before Election Day. Votes cast on touch-screen voting machines at early voting sites are counted as they are cast, and the totals are fed into the central count computer after Election Day. Late-arriving early ballots, early ballots turned in at the polls, and provisional ballots are scanned centrally during the week following Election Day. Four percent of the estimated early ballots, selected in random batches, are set aside for possible hand-count auditing immediately after the election. One percent of the actual early ballots are selected for the hand-count audit.

 

If the hand-count audits agree with the machine counts, the machine count will become the official result.  If hand counts do not agree with the machine counts, additional precincts will be selected for hand counts, in stages up to all the precincts in the county.  If the hand counts are expanded to the entire county, the hand counts will become the official result.

 

 

b.    Party roles and election integrity structure

 

The two major political parties are tasked in Arizona law with overseeing elections. All election teams (Precinct Boards, Early Boards, Duplication Boards, Write-in Boards, etc.) are required to have at least one Republican and one Democrat, and the teams overall are supposed to be evenly divided between the political parties. In fact, the County party chairs are authorized to name the election workers that the county will hire, if they do so at least 90 days before an election.

 

In addition to election workers, who are actually employed by the county elections department and are paid nominal amounts for their work, political parties and candidates are entitled to assign observers to watch any and all parts of the elections process.

 

The involvement of the political parties is considered fundamental to assuring the integrity of the election. There is no other oversight during an election.

 

c.                                  Risk Assessment

 

There are many ways to fraudulently affect the outcome of an election. Some of the methods can change votes on a small scale, some on a large scale. Some methods are easily discovered and foiled, some are difficult to find. Some methods are legal and some are illegal.  In making decisions about assigning party volunteers to the various task associated with an election, you will want to assess the risk of problems in different areas. You probably cannot oversee every aspect of the election in as much detail and specificity as you would like, so you need to be able to choose where to assign your integrity volunteers in the most effective manner.

 

Specific problems that might affect the integrity of an election are discussed in the next chapter, and discussions of specific actions you might take to assure election integrity are contained in the remaining chapters.


 

 


2.     Breaches of Election Integrity

 

The goal of election integrity is to make the election results honestly reflect the intent of the majority of the voters. There are many ways in which the integrity of an election may be compromised. Some of these are simply human or machine error and some are intentional fraudulent actions.  Because intent is often hard to prove, you must work to keep errors to a minimum regardless of their cause.

 

a.              Bureaucratic problems

 

i.                 Inadequate physical security

 

The security of ballots, voting machines, and election records are all important to the integrity of an election. If a close election requires close scrutiny of the ballots or election records, it is important that they have been stored in a secure manner so that there is no question about their integrity. Unfortunately, many elections departments are rather lackadaisical about their physical security, failing to keep important documents and gear locked up, failing to lock the counting facility, and failing to control access to documents, machines, and facilities.

 

ii.               Inadequate bookkeeping

 

Elections processes are designed to have many cross-checks both to prevent errors and to catch errors when they do occur. If election workers do not fill out all the forms, or copy information from one form to another when the forms should have been filled out independently, or if the elections department loses documents, then the cross-checks may not work effectively.

 

For example, when voters sign in at the precinct, they are supposed to sign on the next available line, leaving no blank lines. In one precinct, it was found that precinct workers were telling people to leave a blank line, or were telling people to sign the provisional register instead of the voter register.  The paperwork was so bad that it was difficult to tell what had actually happened. Our suspicions are that the precinct workers were engaged in fraud.

 

Similarly, political parties need to keep good records of their volunteer assignments and the volunteers need to keep adequate records of their observation activities so that problems can be identified and so that the follow-up can be effective. For example, in a recent election the lack of contemporaneously recorded times on observer logs caused a problem when we tried to match the observer logs with election computer logs.

 

iii.             Inadequately trained poll workers

 

Conducting an election is complicated, and the election workers at the polls need to know how to handle all the different situations that occur. Poorly trained poll workers make many mistakes, causing votes to be lost and voters to be made unhappy with the process. Especially in the election integrity area, poll workers need to know how to handle voter identity problems.

 

iv.            Lack of transparency

 

At the same time that we are demanding election security to prevent fraudulent alteration of the election results, we are also asking for as much election transparency as is practical. By this we mean that observers should be able to see for themselves that everything is being done on the up and up. There should be no secret activities. A good example of this is the operation of the election computer that counts the votes.  The software that controls the vote counting process is declared proprietary by the voting machine company, and no one is allowed to examine it closely to confirm that it does what it is supposed to do and does not allow any fraudulent activity to take place.

 

Although the lack of transparency does not in itself cause the election results to be fraudulent, it does raise questions in voters’ and observers’ minds.  The effectiveness of the democratic system depends on citizens accepting the declared results as valid, and questions from a lack of transparency destroys citizen confidence in democracy. The recent addition of hand-count audits in Arizona is intended to improve the transparency of elections, enabling observers to confirm that secret software is in fact doing what it claims to be doing: counting every vote correctly and honestly.

 

 

b.              System failures

 

The elections process has many steps, providing many opportunities for error. It is important that observers at least spot-check every aspect of the elections process, including voter registration, to provide assurance that errors are kept to a minimum.

 

i.                 Registration errors

 

When citizens register, they may make mistakes in the information they provide to the voter registrar, or may fail to provide updated information when things change. The voter registrar may enter names, addresses, or social security numbers incorrectly into a computer database, or the software that checks voters’ registration information against such things as the voter registration, social security, and drivers license databases may make mistakes. For example, name comparisons in computers often check only the first four or five letters of the surname and may only look at initials instead of given names. These processing shortcuts can lead to erroneous comparisons, especially when combined with erroneously entered data.

 

Periodically, the voter registrar is required by law to clean up the voter registration database.  This is done by mailing confirmation cards to voters who have not voted in a series of elections. If the mailings go astray, either because of erroneous data in the computer or because of a voter’s failure to update the voter registration information on file, a voter may be removed from the database and then find no record when arriving at the precinct to vote.

 

ii.               Ballot errors

 

A candidate’s name might be left off the ballot in some precincts because of incorrect information about district boundaries. The marks that control the scanners might be printed off register so that the ballot cannot be read by the scanner or so that the ballot is read erroneously. A voter might be sent the wrong early ballot and not notice the error. At polling places with multiple precincts, a voter might also be given an incorrect ballot.  All the ballots delivered to a precinct might be for a different precinct. All these errors can lead to the loss of votes for legitimate candidates.

 

iii.             Early voting problems

 

Early voters might be sent the wrong ballot, or might not be sent a ballot at all. Because a voter might have more than one address in the voter registration database, and because early ballots are allowed to be sent to an address other than the official voter registration address, the ballot might be sent to the wrong address so that the voter never receives it. The ballot might be sent too late for the voter to mark it and return it before Election Day.

Two voters in the same household might insert their ballots into each others’ envelopes so that the signatures don’t match when checked by the registrar. All of these problems can lead to the loss of legitimate votes.

 

iv.            Polling place problems

 

Voters might go to the wrong precinct, either because of misinformation or because they moved (the law requires a voter to vote in the precinct where he/she currently lives). An election judge might misunderstand the voter’s name and therefore fail to find it in the register. An election judge might misdirect a voter from one incorrect polling place to another incorrect polling place. A voter might show up with the wrong ID, inadequate ID, or no ID, and might be misdirected by the election judge as to the correct means to correct the problem. A judge might fail to accept a valid ID because of misunderstanding the rules. All these problems can lead to the loss of legitimate votes.

 

v.              Counting problems

 

Ballots can be scanned more than once, through operator error. Ballots that fail to scan are duplicated and the duplication process can introduce errors. Ballots can be lost in the shuffle and never get scanned. If a scanner is not properly calibrated, it can fail to read some faint marks on ballots. Scanners can go out of alignment during the counting process. If a voter marks the ballot in the wrong place (i.e., not in the designated area) or marks the ballot with the wrong kind of pen, the scanner might miss some or all the votes. A power failure or lightning strike could cause a glitch in the computer database. Software bugs can prevent accurate counting in many different ways. All these problems can lead to errors in the reported count of votes.

 

 

c.              Vintage Intentional methods

 

i.                 Deny poor people the opportunity to register

 

Arizona’s Proposition 200, enacted by the voters in 2004, claims to be targeted at illegal aliens trying to vote. There is no significant evidence of non-citizens attempting to register to vote. By requiring documentation proving citizenship, the law causes problems for people who were born at home and have no birth certificates, or who have lost their birth certificates and either don’t know how or cannot afford to pay for a replacement. These problems hit poor people and Indians on reservations much harder than middle-class and upper-class urban dwellers.

 

The Republican party has a record of challenging voter registrations of poor people, especially those in ethnic neighborhoods of large urban areas, claiming either that they don’t live at the address they gave the registrar or that they are felons who are not legally allowed to vote. This tactic, called “caging”, was declared illegal by a federal court twenty-some years ago, and the Republican party signed a consent order agreeing not to do this, but recent elections have found large numbers of poor voters excluded from the voting process through these illegal challenges.

 

ii.               Purge valid voters from registration rolls

 

This is similar to the “caging” process that denies people to right to register in the first place, but is more effective because a voter may not notice that he/she has been removed from the registration list until the day of the election. A number of published reports suggest that the 2007 firing of nine US prosecutors was in large part related to their failure to participate in a national “caging” program and associated “show” prosecutions of unwitting and generally innocent poor people.

 


iii.             Direct voters to the wrong polling place

 

Using lists of registered voters, callers telephone voters to direct them to a voting place that does not exist or to an incorrect voting place. Unsuspecting voters who aren’t sure or their voting place, or who are gullible enough to accept a statement that it has changed, wind up at the wrong place and may easily become discouraged and not vote at all.

 

iv.            Require ID at the polls

 

Proposition 200, in addition to requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote, also requires all voters to bring picture ID (or two non-picture IDs) showing their correct (registered) address to the polling place. Aside from the inconvenience to all voters, some voters – especially poor people who don’t understand the system well – may be sent away confused about what they are supposed to do. The goal is to prevent as many poor people from voting as possible.

 

v.              Prepare false early ballot entries

 

Arizona law allows groups such as political parties or political clubs to request early ballots on behalf of voters who are presumably their members. A group can send in names of poor voters and ask that their early ballots be sent to the group’s address instead of the voters’ addresses. They can then either toss the ballots, preventing the real voter from getting an early ballot, or they could even fill out the ballots and forge the voters’ signatures. A variation on this technique involves getting ballots for voters in nursing homes and assisted living facilities, and then tricking the voters into signing envelopes into which the group places either a differently marked ballot or a spoiled ballot. A more complicated variation could be to create lists of people with driver’s licenses who are not registered to vote, file registration forms in their names with election mail directed to a post office box, request early ballots in those names, and mail in early ballots using those names; as long as all election mail went to the post office box and the real person never tried to register to vote, the fraud might never be discovered. Other than spot-checking voter registrations and early ballot requests, our election integrity effort is unlikely to discover any of these methods.

 

vi.            Stuff the ballot box

 

A group might have some of their members register for the opposite party and then volunteer to serve as an election judge alongside of other group members. If all the key workers at a polling place are really supporters of the same party, there are numbers of things they can do to add fraudulent ballots to the ballot box. They can tell legitimate voters to fill out a provisional ballot and then toss it or take it out of the envelope, change the markings, and insert it into the scanner. They can simply fill out ballots for people who didn’t show up to vote and insert those into the scanner.

 

At the central count facility, if early ballots are not carefully tracked, extra boxes of fraudulent ballots could be introduced into the batches of valid early ballots to be scanned without observers having any clue to the addition. This is why early board observers and early ballot scanning observers should log all batches of early ballots produced by early boards and all batches of early ballots scanned so that the lists can be compared to confirm that no fraudulent ballots were added into the stream of valid early ballots.

 

vii.           Render valid ballots unreadable or unacceptable

 

Once a ballot has been successfully read by the scanner, it is hard to render it unacceptable, but if the election judges claim the scanner is broken, then voters must place their ballots into a box to be scanned later when the scanner is fixed. Judges could alter these not-yet-scanned ballots before scanning them so as to make them invalid or unreadable.  A favorite technique is to simply place an extra vote on a ballot so that the valid vote is rejected by the machine.

 

Adding marks to early ballots before they are scanned is much easier to do than with precinct-cast ballots, and today more than fifty percent of all ballots cast are early ballots.

 

viii.         Replace batches of valid ballots with fake ones

 

Since the early ballot boards are almost always located in a different room from the central count scanners, and during a multi-day process early ballots are stored overnight after being removed from their envelopes but before being scanned, someone could easily replace boxes of valid ballots with boxes of fraudulent ballots. It appears that the people who print ballots do not maintain effective inventory control over the ballots they print, most election departments do not maintain effective inventory control over ballots they use, and in any case modern printing and copying methods make it possible for a well-financed operation to copy blank ballots or print fraudulent ballots from scratch.

 

 

d.              Modern technological intentional methods

 

Because of vendor and election department secrecy, modern technological methods of fraud are pretty much impossible to detect, much less prove.  The following descriptions are mostly hypothetical, though they are based on solid scientific study of election systems. The manic insistence by voting machine vendors on their proprietarily secret software, and the refusal of election departments to permit outside audits of their computer databases lead to a lot of speculation about these methods.

 

i.                 Program computer to count incorrectly

 

Since the computer software in the central count computer as well as the software in the precinct voting machines is all secret and known only to the vendor, it is certainly possible that one or more vendors has written software to optionally alter the count of votes, or to report the totals incorrectly, or to shift votes from one candidate to another candidate. With software, there is literally no limit to the variety of things that can be done.

 

In Arizona, we are somewhat protected by our requirement for hand-count audits, but it is important that precincts to be audited be selected AFTER the initial vote totals have been publicly announced, so that fraudulent totals in the computer cannot be changed for audit precincts between the time of precinct and race selection and the beginning of the actual audit. It is also important that ballots to be audited have been sealed between the time they were taken out of the precinct voting machine so that no one has an opportunity to alter the ballots to match a fraudulent machine count. Ideally, your county should begin the hand-count audit immediately after you select the precincts and races to be audited so that no one has any opportunity to alter ballots to conform to a fraudulent machine count. If a fraudulent count were done in fewer than half the precincts of a county, it would be statistically unlikely (though not impossible) that a hand count of two percent of the precincts would hit upon the fraudulent precincts. This is a flaw in the Arizona law; we should be auditing a statistically significant number of precincts rather than simply two percent.

 

In the case of early ballots, Arizona’s one percent audit is almost totally useless, both because of the small percent of ballots audited and the method of selecting ballots for auditing. Doing what we can under the circumstances, it is important that early ballots selected for audit be sealed and stored in a secure manner to prevent anyone from altering the ballots to match a fraudulent machine count.

 

Early ballots to be audited are selected before they are scanned into the central count computer, so an inside operator or fraud-minded software could easily count the audit-selected early ballots to match the actual marks on the ballots instead of altering the count as might be done on non-audited ballots. Because a vote total summary report must be printed just before beginning to scan a batch of ballots for potential audit, it would be a simple matter for the software to recognize the printing of the report followed immediately by the start of a batch scan so that the software could cease altering votes for the duration of that batch scan. The integrity of the hand-count audit would be much improved if Early Boards sorted the early ballots by precinct and sent them to the precinct workers to be fed into the precinct scanner on Election Day. This would enable early ballots to be audited in the same manner as precinct-cast ballots. The Arizona Secretary of State, the Arizona Legislature, and the various County Election Departments around the state insist this would be either impossible or much too difficult for them to do. This is a large gaping hole in our effort to improve the integrity of elections in Arizona; it is clear that the hand-count audit law needs to be improved.

 

 

ii.               Change the totals in the computer after scanning ballots

 

Since early ballots selected for audit are from random precincts, there is no way to correlate the audit count with the machine count other than the vote totals reports that are printed at the time of scanning, and that only compares the count of that batch of ballots. The overall total of early votes for a county could easily be altered manually in the computer by an inside operator. With more than fifty percent of all votes being in the early voting category, this presents a huge opportunity for fraud.

 

In Arizona, a number of election departments have been discovered to have Microsoft Access software installed on their central count election computers, and the major databases used by Arizona counties are known to be alterable using Microsoft Access, without any trace of the change showing up in the election software’s audit logs. There is absolutely no reason to install Microsoft Access on an election computer for any legitimate purpose. Microsoft Access is not the only application that can alter election records, but it is the most common.

 

iii.             Report fraudulent results from polling places

 

It is possible to trick poll workers into transmitting their results not to the election department’s central count computer but to a third party, who could alter results before retransmitting the results to the central count computer. It is possible to program the precinct scanner’s data card to report different results than those produced by the scanner. This is why it is so important to maintain the security of the precinct scanner and its internal data card before Election Day while it is being delivered to the precinct, during Election Day while it is in use, and after Election Day until the completion of the election canvass. Because of Arizona’s requirement for hand count audits of two percent of the precincts in each county, methods involving altering precinct voting machine results are less likely to succeed; but a two percent audit is not guaranteed to catch all fraud, and an inside perpetrator could theoretically alter ballots before an audit to match a fraudulent result. This is why the hand-count audit should begin immediately after selection of precincts and races to be audited. Your observers at polls, receiving centers, and the hand-count audit should be alert to any anomalous behavior, or evidence such as broken or missing seals, that might indicate tampering with either machines or ballots.

 


3.     Your Rights and Responsibilities

 

a.              Statutory Rights and Responsibilities

 

i.                 Review Voter Registration Lists

 

The Secretary of State’s Election Procedures Manual directs that:

 

“Within eight days after the close of registration, the county recorder shall … deliver

… one electronic media copy of each precinct register within the county to:

• the county chairmen

• the state chairman of each party which has at least four candidates, other than

presidential electors, appearing on the ballot in that county for the current

election

• upon request and without charge, to legislative council

Unless otherwise agreed, the recipients of the precinct register may request paper

copies, rather than the electronic media copy.”

[A.R.S. § 16-168(C)]

 

You will want to check this list to see that it has sufficient numbers of voters, and spot-check to see that regular voters have not been dropped (you can compare a hundred or so names of people you know to be regular voters with the list from the previous election to ensure that they remain in the new list).  This is certainly not a comprehensive check – just a quick review for major problems.

 

ii.               Conduct Logic and Accuracy Tests

 

There are five sets of logic and accuracy tests: the Secretary of State’s team conducts a test of touch-screen voting machines and optical scan voting machines that are to be used in early voting locations; the Secretary of State’s team conducts a second test of precinct voting machines and central count scanners just before the count of early ballots begins, usually about two weeks before Election Day; the Accuracy Certification Board (made up of Party representatives) performs two logic and accuracy tests, one before the election and one after the election. The ballots used in these tests should be filled out by the Party representatives and cast in a manner reflecting actual voting conditions. Each Party representative should create enough ballots to test at least ten percent of the precinct machines.  The same ballots can be used to test touch-screen voting machines and central count scanners. The same tests should be run after all vote-counting is complete to confirm that the machines continue to count without error. A comprehensive logic and accuracy test should be run, before all the other pre-election tests, by the Elections Department staff.  They should test every precinct machine to ensure that it is properly programmed for the correct ballot style and precinct, and every central count scanner to ensure that it correctly counts ballots from every precinct.

 

These logic and accuracy tests are intended to test the programming of the machines for errors, and to test the scanning accuracy of the optical scan voting machines.  They are not intended to determine if fraud is afoot, and they are too limited to test the accuracy of tabulation in a full scale election. A fraudulently programmed voting machine would likely show no errors before and after the election but would recognize actual election conditions and alter votes counted in between the two sets of L&A tests.

 

Your Democratic Party representatives should be people whose ethics are above reproach and who thrive on detail work and are meticulous in their work. The L&A tests involve a lot of careful counting and comparisons. You should have at least two people trained so that if one of them becomes unavailable for any reason, the other can proceed with the tests.

 

The Party representatives who perform the logic and accuracy tests may be placed on the County Elections Department’s payroll, but they are nevertheless Party representatives.

 

iii.             Appoint Election Board Members

 

The Secretary of state’s Election Procedures Manual states that:

 

“The appointment of inspectors, marshals and judges shall be:

made not less than 20 days before a primary or general election,

divided equally between the two political parties casting the highest number of

votes in the state at the last general election,

appointed from lists provided 90 days before the election by those parties’

chairmen,

the inspector and marshal shall not be of the same party,

if there are not enough individuals available in the election precinct to serve as

clerks, any registered voter in the election precinct, or in another election

precinct, may be appointed as clerk,

any person appointed as an inspector shall, whenever possible, have had

previous experience as an inspector, marshal, judge or clerk of elections, and

if there is no qualified person in a given precinct, the appointment of an inspector

of election board members may be made from names provided by the county

party chairmen.

If the election precinct consists of fewer than 200 qualified electors, the board of

supervisors may appoint not fewer than:

one inspector and

two judges

The board of supervisors shall give notice of election precincts consisting of fewer than

200 qualified electors to the county chairman of the two largest political parties not later

than 30 days before the election. The inspector and judges shall be appointed in the

same manner as for large precincts.”

[A.R.S. § 16-531]

 

Your opportunity to appoint poll workers to be employed by the County depends on your providing a list to the County Elections Department at least ninety days before each election. Ideally, your precinct committee members would know who has been representing the Democratic Party at their precinct polling places and could advise you as to whether those people are well-trained, ethically reliable, and loyal to Democratic Party ideals.

 

The Secretary of State’s manual (and Arizona law) does not say anything about the right of the County Chair to appoint Early Board members or Central Count Board members.  You might informally obtain approval from your County’s Elections Director to appoint these people; if not, you should at least review the lists of Board members to confirm that the Democratic Party is adequately represented by people you trust to do a good job.

 

Whether you appoint precinct workers or the County does, you should make an effort to ensure that all positions are filled with reliable people.  You can help the County Elections Department by recruiting additional workers.  You can help election integrity by providing supplemental training to Democratic precinct workers on such subjects as voter identification rules and voter rights.

 

iv.            Appoint observers to watch every step of ballot processing

 

The Secretary of State’s Election Procedures Manual states that:

 

“The county chairman of each party that has a candidate on the ballot shall by written

appointment addressed to the election board, designate a political observer and

alternates who may act as challengers for the party for each polling place in a partisan

election in a precinct. Individuals with a written appointment shall be the only persons

recognized as political observers.

[A.R.S. § 16-590]

 

There is no provision in law for observers in non-partisan elections.

 

On election day, political observers should be present at each point where ballots are

handled or transferred from one election official to another. This may include:

closing the polls,

transporting ballots to the receiving site, at any time,

transporting voting results on electronic media to a regional receiving site,

receiving the ballots at the central counting place,

inspecting the ballots,

reviewing any ballots by the write-in board,

duplicating any ballots by the duplication board,

receiving ballots or voting results or electronic media by the data processing

board,

processing by the computer at a regional or central receiving and county facility,

transporting ballots after processing from the central counting place to the county

offices,

transporting early ballots to the central counting place, and

tabulation of early ballots.

During transport, the ballots will always be in a container with the precinct name or

number written on the outside of the container. Observers shall not be permitted to

touch any of the ballots or containers at any time.

[A.R.S. § 16-590]”

 

Whether or not you appoint Early Board members and Central Count Board members, you should appoint observers to watch the various Boards in operation.  You may be satisfied to spot-check the work of some Boards; other Boards will require more observers. For example, the Central Count processing of early ballots needs constant supervision to ensure that proper security is maintained, to ensure that no one prints election summary reports prematurely, and to select batches of early ballots for the hand count audit after the election.

 

The Secretary of State’s Election Procedures Manual describes the following Boards:

 

The central counting place may have as many as seven types of boards, which may be

combined, if practicable, at the discretion of the officer in charge of elections:

receiving board

inspection board

write-in board

duplication board

data processing board

accuracy certification board

"snag" board

Each board shall consist of at least two members, and shall be registered voters of the

two parties casting the highest number of votes in the state at the last preceding general

election. Each board’s responsibilities shall be as provided in this manual.

Board members may serve on more than one board, as long as each board task may

be performed in the prescribed sequence.

The central counting place operation will be conducted under the direction of the board

of supervisors or officer in charge of elections:

in accordance with the procedures outlined in this manual,

under the observation of:

representatives of each political party, and

the public.

 

In addition, the manual describes Early Boards for processing early ballots, and an Audit Board to review all precinct-level election results just before the official canvass. Since more than fifty percent of the ballots are early ballots, the Early Boards have become much more important to watch to confirm election integrity. The Audit Board is an important part of confirming the integrity of the election results.

 

v.              Randomly select precincts and races to be audited

 

Within 24 hours after the close of Election Day, the County Party Chairs are supposed to get together with the Elections Director and randomly select precincts to be hand counted.  The Secretary of State’s Hand Count manual states:

 

“The County Political Party Chairmen shall conduct the selection of the precincts to be hand counted.  The precincts shall be selected by lot without the use of a computer and the order of selection by the County Political Party Chairmen shall also be by lot.  The County Officer and the County Political Party Chairmen shall agree to the lot method.

 

The selection of the precincts shall not begin until all ballots voted in the precinct polling places have been delivered to the central counting center.  The unofficial vote totals from all the precincts shall be made public before selecting the precincts to be hand counted. [A.R.S. § 16-602(C)]”

 

The 2006 changes in the law permit a county chair to designate someone to perform these tasks.

 

You should compare the published results for the selected precincts (which you should have in hand before beginning the selection process) with the results presented to the hand count teams to be sure that no one has changed the results in the computer between precinct selection and precinct counting.

 

The law passed by the legislature requires the selection of at least two percent of the precincts in each county for the hand count audit.  If two percent of your county’s precincts is only one precinct, then the law requires you to hand count at least two precincts. Four races are to be selected for hand counting in each selected precinct: one Federal race, one State race, one Legislative race, and one Proposition race.  If the election includes the Presidential race, then it is added to the other four, making a total of five races to be hand counted. In the cases of Congressional or legislative races, the districts (candidates) may vary among the selected precincts.

 

If there are fewer than four contested races in a selected precinct, and if there are other statewide, federal, or legislative races available that are contested, one of those races should be selected to fill out the required four or five selected races. [ARS 16-602(C)2]

 

When you select precincts and races for the hand count audit, you should make sure that your random selection process makes it equally possible for every precinct to be selected. If you are drawing slips of paper from a hat, for example, there need to be as many slips of paper as there are precincts, with a different precinct number on each slip of paper. Dividing the precinct selection by drawing different slips for different digits probably would bias the selection process in favor of some precincts and against others.

 

Although drawing slips of paper is the most obvious way to randomly select precincts, there are alternate methods not requiring a computer or slips of paper. One such method  would have participants select large integers (say, 6-8 digits) and then use remainder arithmetic to determine the precinct. For example, divide the large integer by the number of precincts in the county, multiply the integer portion of the quotient by the number of precincts in the county and then subtract the product from the large number selected – resulting in a “random” number smaller than the number of precincts in the county. If the subtraction results in the number 0 (i.e., the product divides evenly into the large number), the precinct selected would be the highest numbered precinct in the county.

 

Once the precincts and races have been selected for audit, the audit should begin immediately, so that there is no opportunity for anyone to alter any ballots between the time precincts and races are selected and the actual audit begins.

 

vi.            Appoint audit workers to hand count some of the ballots

 

The 2006 law requires that County Party Chairs appoint sufficient numbers of audit workers to perform the audit, at least two auditors per audit precinct.  Your list of proposed hand count auditors must be delivered to the officer in charge of the election by 5 pm on the Tuesday preceding the election. If the total number of audit workers is less than four per audit precinct, the officer in charge of the election must notify county party chairs by 9 am the next morning. Party chairs then have until 5 pm on Thursday to fill out the lists. If insufficient numbers of audit workers show up to perform the audit, the elections director may cancel the audit in your county.

 

The audit workers must be registered voters but need not belong to the party that appoints them.  In fact they need not belong to any party, so you may also appoint independents to help with the audit.  If your list of audit workers contains more people than the required numbers, your extra people may be appointed by other parties if they come up short. If there are insufficient numbers of auditors available in your county, you may appoint registered voters from other Arizona counties to help with the audit.

 

vii.           Supervise the audit

 

The audit’s integrity will be best if the audit begins immediately after selection of the precincts and races, so that no one has an opportunity to alter any ballots, precinct documents, or early ballot summary reports.  In any case, your observers should ensure that all tamper-revealing seals are intact on all containers and that the numbers on the seals match the numbers on logs created at the time they were placed on the containers. Documents signed by precinct poll workers should be checked to confirm that signatures are present and valid.

 

You should plan to be present to oversee the hand count.  Some decisions can only be made by the County Party Chairs – not their representatives. For example, if one or more audit workers fail to show up, or need to drop out of the audit after it starts, it might be necessary for you to appoint a replacement.  Your designated representative is not legally allowed to do that.

 

It is important that at least one party representative be responsible for collecting all the hand count results as each hand count is finished, and the precinct counts should be compared with the precinct vote totals report published before the precinct and race selection began. Otherwise, the results will be tabulated only by the election department with no accountability for the results.

 

 

b.       Actions not legally specified but desirable and useful

 

i.                 Obtain copies of computer logs, election department reports, databases

 

To confirm the integrity of the election, you will want to have someone review the computer logs, the election department reports, and the computer databases. As it is possible for someone to falsify precinct logs, it is also possible for someone to alter numbers in the computer databases or to print vote total summary reports prematurely to provide some candidate the advantage of knowing before election day how the early vote count is going.

 

The review of these documents will necessarily happen after the election, but your request for them should be submitted before the election, and you should ensure that they are delivered to you before the County’s Canvass of the election.  After the Canvass, the ballots are placed in a vault, and it is possible that some other documents might find their way into the vault by accident.  The lawsuit launched in early 2007 in Pima County involves vote total summary reports printed to support the hand count audit of early ballots that were inadvertently placed in the vault along with the early ballots. After documents are in the vault, it may be necessary to obtain a court order to retrieve them.

 

The issue of the release of computer databases to political parties is currently unsettled. You might find your Elections Director reluctant to release any of the copies of the database of vote totals.  Pima County’s lawsuit hopes to establish a precedent in this area.

 

ii.               Analyze all the data collected by observers and from the Elections Department

 

All election-related documents should be consistent with each other.  Most information is recorded in multiple ways, so it is possible to verify most data by comparing different documents.  You may also want to compare your observers’ logs with those created by the Elections Department employees to verify the accuracy of all the data. Inconsistent data could be an indicator of improper activity.

 

iii.             Ask questions about any procedure that seems incorrect or insecure

 

Elections are very complicated processes, and it is likely that you will find parts of the process that could use improvement.  Often the procedure is just the way it has always been done, but the location of the action may have changed, the technology used may have changed, or the people performing the process may have changed, sometimes requiring a review of the procedure and new decisions about what makes sense in the current context.

 

If you work cooperatively with the Elections Director and his/her staff, you may be able to improve the integrity of the elections process in many small (and some large) ways. Written communications, at least to confirm verbal agreements, will help to avoid misunderstandings.

 

 


4.     People Involved in Ensuring Election Integrity

 

a.              Election Boards-paid employees of the County Election Department

 

A number of Boards are described in the Secretary of State’s Election Procedures Manual.  The law and the manual both state that an Elections Director may alter or combine functions if needed, so you might find some Boards missing and others combined into one.

 

i.                 Accuracy Certification Board

 

You will be allowed to appoint one or two people to serve on this Board, which observes the Secretary of State’s Logic and Accuracy tests, conducts its own Logic and Accuracy tests (before and after the election), and observes the count of ballots after the election. This Board also performs the functions of the Snag Board mentioned in the Secretary of State’s election manual, making joint decisions on how the election department personnel should handle odd cases not clearly defined in the manual. These appointees will probably be placed on the County payroll and will probably be paid some nominal amount for their service.

 

Traditionally, this Board seems not to have much been involved with observing the count of early ballots, but with the large number of early ballots being cast, and the requirement for hand counting a random selection of early ballots, it is now important that party observers participate, and there is a question as to whether these early ballot count observers should be members of the Accuracy Certification Board or simply be party volunteers.

 

ii.               Poll workers-Inspectors, Marshals, Judges, Clerks

 

If you act at least 90 days before an election, you have the legal authority to appoint Democratic poll workers to work on Election Day.  If you do not act at least 90 days before an election, the County Election Department must find and hire people to fill those positions, and the law requires that they balance the Republicans and Democrats in each precinct – if the inspector is of one party, the Marshal must be of the other; judges must be similarly divided evenly. You should review the list of poll workers to ensure that Democrats are indeed adequately represented in each precinct.  Ideally, your precinct committee members will know the Democratic poll workers and can confirm their competence and party loyalty.

 

Your Election Department will likely be happy to have your assistance in filling slots, even up to Election Day, and will be glad to have your assistance in naming backup workers to replace those who fail to show up on Election Day.

 

iii.             Early Boards

 

Your Election Department will appoint a number of people to serve on Early Boards – confirming their validity, checking for ballots that will not be read properly by the scanner, and duplicating ballots when necessary. A board consists of two persons from different political parties. In large elections, there may be several such boards that operate for several days running as early ballots are mailed in[TR1] . You should endeavor to participate in the appointment of these people, but the law is not clear about your rights. In any case, you will want to review the names of appointees to confirm their competence and integrity.

 

Your observers should ensure that ballots are properly handled and stored, that completed ballots are sealed in containers protected by tamper-revealing seals at the end of the day or before shipment to the central count facility, and that ballot shipments are escorted by both a Democrat and a Republican.

 

iv.            Duplication Boards

 

These are groups of people (two per Board) who attempt to create a readable ballot for the scanner by copying votes from an unreadable ballot, either one thrown out by an Early Board or one rejected by the central scanner itself.  A log is kept of each ballot duplicated, and the two people on each Board must be from different parties. There may be several of these Boards working alongside the Early Boards and the Provisional Boards, and you will want to review the names of appointees to confirm their competence and integrity.

 

Your observers should confirm that blank ballots used by these boards are securely stored and properly inventoried.

 

v.              Receiving Boards

 

The receiving Boards check in equipment, ballots, and logs from the precincts and track any missing items. The requirement is that each Board consists of a Republican and a Democrat.  You will want to review the names of appointees to confirm their competence and integrity.

 

Your observers at receiving centers should watch for material arriving without the required Democrat and Republican escort, or ballots or voting machines being sent to the central count facility with the required Democrat and Republican escort.

 

vi.            Inspection Boards

 

Inspection Boards open the bags and boxes received from precincts on election night and check the ballot report form to make sure seals have not been broken in route; they create a log showing write-in ballots, provisional ballots, and early ballots dropped off at the precinct; they separate different types of ballots for different kinds of further processing. Receiving and Inspection Boards may be combined.  Each Inspection Board consists of two members of different political parties. You will want to review the names of appointees to confirm their competence and integrity.

 

Your observers should watch for broken seals, unsealed ballot containers, loose ballots, etc. They should log such instances separately from the Board workers for later comparison. They should also confirm that Board workers are logging such information and make note of omissions.

 

vii.           Provisional Boards

 

After the Recorder’s Office has checked the affidavits on provisional ballot envelopes to determine if they were cast by a valid voter, the Provisional Boards open the envelopes and collect the provisional ballots for scanning.  Each Provisional Board consists of two members of different political parties. You will want to review the names of appointees to confirm their competence and integrity.

 

viii.         Write-in Boards

 

Each Write-in Board consists of an Inspector and two Judges, with both major parties represented. The Write-in Boards review ballots identified either at the polling places or during the central count processing as having one or more write-in votes to determine if the votes are for registered write-in candidates.  They label and sign invalid write-in votes and tally the valid write-in votes. You will want to review the names of appointees to confirm their competence and integrity.

 

ix.             Audit Board

 

The Secretary of State’s Election Manual does not specify the make-up of the Audit Board, but does say that the Board’s activities are to be supervised by political observers, presumably from at least the two major political parties. The Audit Board’s task is to review all paperwork from the other boards and to compare precinct records showing voter totals and vote totals with results reported by the central election computer for every precinct and race, prior to certification of the election results for the official canvass. This is an important double-check of all the election activity.

 

 

b.              Election Observers – for every Board

 

Ideally, you would assign an observer to every Board – both central count boards and precinct boards. This would require a lot of volunteer observers.  If you know the Democratic members of the Boards and are confident of their competence and integrity, you might choose to limit your observers to the critical central count boards.  Consider, however, that Board members are employed by the Election Department and are not free to communicate all that they see to your election integrity team, at least not in real time, so having observers stationed at strategic places may be valuable, if you can round up sufficient volunteers.

 

Because opportunities for undetected large-scale fraud are greatest in the early ballot processing and the central computer activity, you will want to be sure these activities have sufficient numbers of observers. Because the hand-count audit has the greatest chance of detecting fraud, you will want to fully support the hand-count audit with sufficient numbers of audit workers. Because the Audit Board double-checks all other election boards, you will want to have an observer there as well.

 

 

c.              Other election integrity people

 

i.                 Recruiters

 

These people will make telephone calls, send out emails, and review lists of voters to find suitable volunteers to staff the various election boards and to serve as observers.

 

ii.               Coordinators

 

For large operations such as observers of the early ballot counting during the week or two before election day, and the hand count audit after election day, it will be advantageous to have a coordinator to keep track of who has volunteered, who is available to work at various times, and to ensure that volunteers are informed of the latest information about the task. A coordinator of volunteers might also keep track of who is available for various tasks and pass names on to coordinators of specific tasks.

 

iii.             Planners

 

Because of the complexity of the election operations, you might find it useful to have one or more planners to collect information from the election department and to plan how Democratic volunteers will be organized to meet the various needs.

 

iv.            Liaisons

 

The different teams of volunteers are not entirely separate from one another, and it will be useful to assign someone from each group to serve as a communications liaison to the Democratic Party headquarters and to other related groups of volunteers, to improve communication and coordination between the different groups.

v.              Researchers

 

Observers should log their observations, and someone (or a group) should collect and review the various observation logs and compare the data with data they derive from a review of Election Department records.  There are many uses for doing research, but two important ones are: confirming the integrity of the overall election, and deriving information about local problems that need to be resolved before the next election.

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


5.     Ensuring Election Integrity at the Polls

a.              Voters Rights and Likely Problems

 

As a result of the 2002 Help America Vote Act and recent Arizona law changes, voters generally have the right to fill out a ballot even if challenged and even if they do not have the required identification. They may be required to vote provisional or conditional provisional ballots which may or may not be counted, but they do have the right to fill out a ballot before leaving the polling place.

 

Problems generally arise when (1) a voter is not listed in the precinct register as an active voter in that precinct, (2) a voter does not have the expected identification, (3) someone challenges the voter’s right to cast a ballot, (4) a voter is intimidated outside the polling place, or (5) a voter finds a long time delay caused by a line of voters waiting to vote.

 

Particularly in problem precincts (you probably know where they are – usually in poor or ethnic minority areas), you should have poll watchers present to assist voters with these and any other problems that might arise. Ideally these poll watchers will be people trained in the law and knowledgeable about Arizona election law in particular. Non-lawyers may with sufficient training serve satisfactorily as long as they know their own limitations and are astute enough to seek support when needed.

 

b.              Poll Watchers’ Limitations

 

Poll watchers may provide advice to individual voters or to the Inspector who is charge of the polling place when the advice is requested and accepted willingly. If there is a dispute between a voter and a poll worker or between a voter and a challenger, the poll watcher should be extremely careful about getting involved without the encouragement of the Inspector at the polling place. In any dispute with the Inspector, the poll watcher should seek outside help either from an Election Department troubleshooter or from local legal experts who are on call for such situations.

 

c.              Getting Help

 

You should arrange for a lawyer with expertise in election law (or, in larger counties, as many as might be needed) to be on call on Election Day for assisting with difficult situations that poll watchers cannot easily handle. Each poll watcher should have a cell phone and both the Democratic lawyer’s on-call telephone number and the Election Department’s troubleshooting telephone number at hand.

 

If a dispute arises, whether it involves a single voter, procedures at the polling place, or voter intimidation outside the polling place, the first appeal should go to the Inspector and Marshal who are in charge of the polling place. The Inspector is the chief authority on the spot and generally has the authority to solve problems, whether they involve interpreting rules or applying common sense to situations not clearly covered by rules. Since the Inspector and Marshal are from opposite parties, their joint decisions will be less likely to be appealed.

 

If the Inspector and Marshal fail to solve a problem, then the next appeal should be to the Election Department.

 

Failing to obtain a solution either from the Inspector and Marshal or from the Election Department, the poll watcher should call the Democratic lawyer hotline and follow the troubleshooter’s advice or turn the problem entirely over to the troubleshooter.

d.              Recruiting and Training Poll Watchers

 

You should begin well in advance of Election Day with the recruitment and training of poll watchers. First decide how many precincts are likely to have problems and then seek some number of poll watchers in excess of that number. You will prefer lawyers, law students, paralegals, or others with specific training in the law, but you may have to also recruit others without formal legal training. Ideally you will prefer people who are well-versed in election law but you will probably have to accept people without formal election law training.

 

Your poll watcher recruits should at least have logical minds, be able to read and interpret the rules, be able to handle sensitive situations with tact, and be able to calm tense situations without losing their tempers. As Rudyard Kipling said, “if you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs and blaming it on you,” you will be a good poll watcher.

 

You should set up at least one training session for the volunteer poll watchers, taught by a lawyer who is knowledgeable about election law in Arizona and preferably has served either as a poll watcher or as an on-call troubleshooter in a previous Arizona election.

 

Each poll watcher should be provided with a copy of appendix A, the Arizona Election Day Manual, which contains a list of voters’ rights, a problem solving chart, a brief summary of Arizona law pertaining to polling places, some reminders about conduct at the polls, and contact numbers. You may want to add local numbers to the list provided in the appendix.

 


6.     Ensuring Election Security

 

a.              Security of ballots

 

i.                 Accounting for ballots printed and delivered to the County

 

Arizona law says nothing about accounting for every ballot printed, but it would be possible for someone to skew an election by filling out fraudulent ballots and either adding them to the mix of valid ballots or by replacing batches of valid ballots with equal sized batches of fraudulent ballots. A major weak point in the election process is when marked ballots are transported from one place to another – there is an opportunity to introduce batches of fraudulent ballots.

 

You should determine how many ballots were printed for each ballot style (a precinct or a small group of precincts), how many were used (there are multiple ways of counting these, and the different counts should be compared), and how many remain in inventory after the election is completed.

 

ii.               Accounting for ballots used

 

The recorder’s office keeps a log of ballots mailed out and of mailed-in ballots received, as well as ballots shipped to early voting sites and ballots used at early voting sites. These numbers should be compared to confirm that all ballots are properly accounted for.  The Election Department should log ballots shipped to precincts and ballots received from precincts, as well as ballots set aside for duplication boards’ use and ballots actually used by duplication boards. If you collect all these numbers from all sources, it should be possible to determine what happened to every ballot. If any significant number of ballots cannot be accounted for, there is at least a record-keeping problem and (less likely but possible) an indication of fraud.

 

iii.             Accounting for ballots not used

 

At the completion of the election process, the election department should count the ballots that remain in inventory and confirm that the number is consistent with the total number printed and the total number used. You should ask the election department to confirm these numbers and, if necessary, provide volunteer assistance to do the counting.

 


iv.            Transporting ballots from one location to another

 

Because Arizona’s population has grown considerably over the past few decades, county election departments often have outgrown their space and have thus had to divide their operations between multiple locations, requiring that  ballots be transported form one location to another during the election processing.  Although the law clearly specifies that transportation must be done under the supervision of two people from different political parties, this transportation task is a weak link in the processing of early ballots in particular.  It provides an excellent opportunity for someone to swap fraudulent ballots for valid ballots, or to add marks to valid ballots while they are en route. Your observers should log all ballot containers created by the early boards and all containers of ballots scanned by the central count scanners, and compare the lists to confirm that no substitutions, deletions, or additions occurred.

 

v.              Other chain of custody issues

 

Although transportation of ballots from one location to another is a primary target for interrupting the chain of custody by introducing fraudulent ballots or changing valid ballots, the chain of custody issue is much larger than just the transportation problem. Early ballots could be altered any time after they are taken out of their envelopes, including after they have been scanned into the computer.  For example, if someone programmed the central count computer to mis-count ballots, it might then be necessary to physically alter the ballots selected for hand count audit to match the computer’s totals.  Ballots should be stored in sealed containers at all times, with tamper-revealing seals to prevent the sealed containers from being opened while supposedly in storage.  Observers should take care to ensure that seals are placed on ballot containers, to log all seal numbers at every stage of processing, and to compare seal numbers for each container of ballots from one step of processing to the next to be sure they have not changed.

 

Chain of custody also applies to voting machines, particularly those sent out to polling places.  There should be tamper-revealing seals on containers shipped out; those should be confirmed by poll workers to be sure they have not changed and that the seals have not been damaged.  Ballot bags and containers of voting machines, precinct logs, etc. should be sealed at each precinct with tamper-revealing seals and those seals should be checked by the receiving or inspection boards at the central count facility. If you have sufficient volunteers, you might consider having observers also record seals numbers and compare them.  In any case, obtaining copies of the precinct reports and the inspection logs for comparison after the election is an excellent way of confirming that chain of custody has not been broken.

 


vi.            Tamper-revealing seals

 

Tamper-revealing seals are plastic labels that have been numbered sequentially so that each label has a unique number. They are constructed so that when the label is removed from whatever surface to which it was applied, the label’s design will change so that even if the label is reapplied, the label will still reveal that it was once removed from something.

 

We generally accept the premise that every tamper-revealing label used in an election is actually unique – that duplicate labels were not created. To ensure that this is so, you might arrange with the officer in charge of the election for observers to sign their names across tamper-revealing seals to ensure that those seals could not be fraudulently replaced without detection (this of course must be done so as to leave the seal number readable).

 

Tamper-revealing seals can be applied to boxes of ballots, to voting machine doors, to computer cabinet doors, to crates containing voting machines, even to doors to central count processing rooms – all to assure that no one had access to something that was intended to be held securely.

 

When boxes of ballots are closed for transport or storage, they should be sealed top and bottom with tamper-revealing seals. A log should be kept of all the seal numbers, and checked just before opening the boxes for the next step in processing to be sure the boxes have not been opened or switched with other boxes.

 

 

b.              Security of election machines

 

i.                 Physical security

 

To confirm the integrity of an election, you need to assure yourself that ballots, voting machines, central count computers, and assorted paper documents were held and transported securely at all times during the election process.  Physical security is a large part of this. Tamper-revealing seals can only be trusted if you are sure that there are no duplicate numbers available to a person wanting to alter votes.  Additional security mechanisms include locks on doors that are alarmed; locking systems that record the name of each person passing through a door or otherwise opening a lock; video surveillance cameras that record a picture of anyone entering a room.

 

Physical security of ballot storage areas and of early ballot processing rooms is also important. Physical security of ballots after they are scanned into the computer is as important as physical security before scanning.

 

ii.               Checking the software on the election machines

 

Software on election machines (both optical scan and touch-screen) should be checked before the machines are sent out to precincts or to early voting sites, to be sure that the correct version of software is installed, and that the machines are programmed for the proper precincts. Even with this checking, it is well-known that both optical scan and touch screen voting machines are easily hacked, so it is important to question any machine which is missing its tamper-revealing seal or that has a damaged seal.

 

The logic and accuracy tests conducted by the parties and by the secretary of state’s office are only confidence-building measures – since they only check a small percentage of the total set of voting machines, they cannot provide comprehensive confirmation for all machines. You should encourage the Election Department staff to actually test every machine for its suitability for the voting location in which it will be used.

 

c.              Security of the central count system

 

 

The software on the central count computer should be checked by a computer professional to confirm that it is the version that was approved for use in the current election. Non-approved software should not be on the computer.  No software other than the approved election software should be installed on the computer.  Specifically, software such as Microsoft Access, Word, or Excel should not be installed on the computer, because they could be used to alter the election database.

 

Security of the central count computer also involves ensuring that all cables linking computer peripherals are in full view of observers at all times so that you can confirm that no cables connect the central count computer to anything outside the room. Locking the central count computer when it is not in use and detaching the keyboard and monitor while the computer is locked are also good physical security.  Any computer printer should be in the central count computer room, in full view of observers.

 

Removing the disc drives from the central count computer and locking them in a vault would be an excellent physical security policy, though the only place we have found such a policy is in the City of Tucson’s Election Department (this would require physical alteration of the computer long before an election season began to allow removable disc drives to be installed).

 


i.                 Early ballot counting computer security

 

Because of the large number of early ballots, most counties will begin counting early ballots days or even weeks before Election Day. The computer will thus be left in place, probably turned on, during the nights and weekends when early ballot scanning is not taking place. Ideally the computer should be turned off at night and the disk drives containing the election database should be removed and locked in a vault that is sealed with a tamper-revealing seal. This is the procedure in the Tucson City elections, but other election departments are not so concerned about security.  You might find that your influence can improve this situation, at least in the long term.

 

At the very least, the computer should be turned off and locked up in a cabinet with tamper-revealing seals to ensure that it is not opened or turned on during the time observers are not present.

 

ii.               Computer audit logs

 

Both the election counting application software and the operating system software should maintain activity logs that can be examined after the election for anomalous activity, such as improper manipulation or replacement of the vote-count database. Before the election, you should confirm that these activity logs are operating properly.

 

iii.             Security camera monitoring and logs

 

The room(s) in which ballots are stored overnight and in which ballots are scanned should be monitored by security cameras which will store their images at least from the beginning of the election to the completion of all election activity. If the security cameras feed their images to a computer, they can be stored in a digital file indefinitely. You should have at least one of your observers review these security camera records after the election results have been announced, and they should compare the security camera records with any observer logs of questionable activity during the counting of ballots.

 

iv.            Party Observers’ role in maintaining security

 

During the scanning of ballots, observers should watch for any anomalous behavior by any of the election department staff. Observers should keep a log to be sure that every box of ballots is scanned and that no box is scanned twice. Ask questions when any computer activity other than ballot scanning appears to be taking place. Record the apparent activity, the questions asked and the answers; this information can be compared after the election is over with the computer activity logs and with the security camera records. There are sample forms in the appendix that your observers may find useful.

 

d.              Security of vote-total reports printed before the end of Election Day

 

 

 

i.                 Being alert to anything and everything coming out of the printer

 

Before and after scanning each box of ballots intended for the hand-count audit, the computer operator will need to print a summary report that shows vote totals in all races.  The hand-count auditors will subtract the numbers on this pair of reports to determine the number of votes recorded by the computer on that set of ballots. Your observers should watch the printer to be sure that the summary reports are placed in an envelope and sealed without anyone looking at the reports. The envelope should be clearly marked so that the association between the ballots and the summary reports is maintained for the hand count audit.  The envelope containing the summary reports should not be placed inside the box of corresponding ballots because most of those boxes will not be opened during the hand audit, and any summary reports stored inside ballot boxes will probably be unavailable for scrutiny after the election. 

 

Your observers should also track anything else that comes out of the printer.  There should be a cards cast report at the beginning and end of each day’s scanning activity to ensure that the total number of ballots counted does not change overnight.  No other reports should be printed before the end of Election Day. If anything else is printed, the observers should ask what it is, look at it to confirm the answer, and log the event so that it can be compared with the computer activity logs after the election.

 

ii.               Sealing early reports and recording seal numbers

 

The only vote-total reports that should be printed before one hour after the polls close on Election Day are those that are needed for the hand-count audit. Those reports should be placed in a clearly marked envelope with tamper-revealing seals to ensure that the envelope is not opened until after Election Day. Observers should sign their names across the tamper-revealing seal or across the sealed envelope flap. Your observers should keep a log of the seal numbers and all those numbers should be checked before the beginning of the hand-count audit.

 

iii.             Checking all seal numbers after Election Day

 

Before beginning the hand-count audit, all seal numbers on all boxes of early ballots selected for potential audit as well as all seal numbers on envelopes containing early vote totals reports to ensure that no reports were seen by anyone before the end of Election Day.

 

 


e.              Security of the audit

 

 

i.                 Sealing early ballots selected for audit and recording seal numbers

 

To be sure that neither ballots nor computer-generated reports have been altered before the audit begins, early-ballot-scanning observers should place seals on ballot and vote-totals reports containers, and log those seal numbers for use by observers of the hand-count audit.

 

 

ii.       Checking all seals after Election Day

 

Before the start of the hand-count audit, all tamper-revealing seals should be checked to be sure they have not been removed or replaced.

 

 

iii.       Precinct-level report of votes BEFORE selection of precincts for audit

 

The law requires that the election department publish a precinct-level report of votes before the selection of precincts for audit. This is to ensure that no one has any opportunity to alter numbers in the computer after audit precincts have been selected but before the actual audit begins. The precinct report should include both precinct-cast and early ballot tallies. In most counties, this report, if printed on paper, will be very large. You should request that the report be provided in the form of a text file on a computer disk.  This will enable your analysts to examine all the numbers and perform statistical analyses on them, in addition to confirming the vote totals for the precincts to be audited.

 

The numbers in the precinct-level vote totals reports should be compared by an observer with the numbers used in the hand-count audit to be sure they are the same.

 

 

iv.      Selecting the precincts and races to be audited

 

The law requires that precincts and races be selected by a non-machine method. This probably will be a process of placing precinct numbers and names of races on slips of paper into baskets or boxes and then having the party chairs take turns selecting them for audit. If you are unsure of the randomness of the process chosen in your county, ask questions and review the process with someone you trust who is knowledgeable about statistics.

 

A number of precincts equal to at least two percent of the precincts in your county are to be selected and audited. If your county has fewer than 100 precincts, at least two precincts will be audited.  At least four races are to be selected for audit: one legislative race, one state-wide race, one federal race, and one ballot initiative or referendum issue.  If the election involves the US Presidency, that race is to be added to the four other races to be audited. Depending on which precincts are selected in a county, there may be different legislative or Congressional races in those precincts.  If a legislative race is selected for audit, then it is to be audited no matter who the individual candidates are.

 

If possible, you should arrange for the hand-count audit to begin immediately after the precincts and races are chosen for audit, to eliminate any possibility that someone could alter ballots from precincts chosen for audit.

 

 

v.       Selecting the early ballots to be audited

 

During the counting of early ballots, observers will select batches of ballots to be audited.  The hand count for early ballots must include at least 1% of the total number of early ballots.  Because the law allows for an expansion of the hand count if discrepancies are found, the number of batches set aside should encompass at least 4% of the early ballots. At the time of the hand count, a number of batches are selected from the available batches.  This should be done randomly, so that the selected batches span the central count scanners as well as the time period over which ballots were scanned.  Thus some of the batches should be taken from the first few days of counting, and also from the last few days.  For each selected batch, it is necessary to locate the envelope containing the two summary reports that are used to determine the expected vote totals for the batch.

 

 

vi.      Checking precinct-cast ballot bag tamper-revealing seals

 

Before the hand-count audit begins, you should have an observer check the tamper-revealing seals placed on containers of ballots by the precinct election judges.  These containers should not have been opened before the beginning of the audit, and the seal numbers should match those logged by the precinct judges on a form that they signed on Election Day.

 

If the seal on any container of ballots is missing or has been replaced, or the seal has been damaged, you should insist that another precinct be chosen for audit, either in addition to the precinct with the damaged or missing seal or in place of it. Auditing a precinct whose ballots’ security is questionable would be a useless activity.

 

 

vii.     Checking seals on touch-screen voting machine cartridges

 

The cartridges from touch-screen voting machines should arrive at the place of the hand-count audit with intact tamper-revealing seals showing that no one has opened the cartridge since the election. You should have an observer check the seal numbers against the seal numbers logged by the precinct election judges on a form that they signed on Election Day.

 

Because in Arizona  touch-screen voting machines are used primarily to satisfy federal requirements for handicapped voter access, it may be that there are few enough votes recorded in a particular touch-screen voting machine cartridge so that demanding a different precinct be audited would be irrelevant to the outcome of the election.  Also, because these machines are new, the likelihood is greater that judges in some precincts might have failed to place seals on the cartridges or might have damaged the seals in the process, so you will want to exercise some common sense restraint in complaining about these seals.

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


7.     Ensuring election integrity-data collection and analysis

 

a.                   Collecting data

 

i.                 Recording ballots at every step of the process

 

The number of volunteers you have available, especially during the processing of early ballots, will necessarily determine how much observing and logging of activity can be done.  Because of the opportunity for large-scale fraud in the processing of early ballots, you should have observers log all packages of ballots prepared by the early boards and also all packages of early ballots scanned into the central election computer, to ensure that no batches have been lost or replaced, that no ballots have been scanned twice, and that no fraudulent batches have been added between the early boards and the central scanners. Whenever ballots are out of sight of observers, there is an opportunity for fraudulent activity to occur, so those parts of the process need the most scrutiny. 

 

Early ballot observers should log every box of ballots created and scanned, including seal numbers, number of ballots in the box, the number successfully scanned, and the number rejected by the scanner. This will enable you to independently verify that no ballots went astray, no fraudulent ballots were introduced, and no ballots were scanned twice.

 

ii.               Recording seal numbers on boxes of ballots

 

Early ballot observers should record seal numbers of tamper-revealing seals placed on the boxes by the early ballot boards, so that these seal numbers can be compared when the boxes of ballots are about to be scanned.

 

Seal numbers of tamper-revealing seals placed on boxes of ballots selected for potential audit should also be recorded by early ballot observers, so that they can be checked before the start of the audit.

 

Early ballot vote totals reports should be stored separately from the boxes of audit ballots with which they are associated, the envelopes or boxes containing those reports should also be sealed with tamper-revealing seals, and a log should be kept of those numbers so that they can be checked before the start of the audit.

 


iii.             Recording times

 

Times can be very important when analyzing election activity after the election process is complete. Your observers should record times of all activity as precisely as possible so that these times can be compared with computer activity logs, times printed on reports, and times of activity recorded by security cameras. An error of a minute or two can be important, and logging an activity with no accompanying time can prevent effective analysis after the fact. If possible, observers should agree on what the correct time is, especially when one observer relieves an observer from an earlier time period.

 

Checking the computer clock time displayed on the computer monitor and comparing it with a clock on the wall and with the observer’s watch are all useful checks on accuracy of times recorded in the observers’ logs.

 

iv.            Recording names of people performing different tasks

 

In the event that a question arises during the analysis of election data after the election is complete, it might be important to know which person on the election department staff performed which functions. Even if the computer system is set to log each user through an individual login sequence, it is still possible for someone other than the logged-in user to operate the keyboard of the computer. If suspicious activity is discovered after the fact, having an observer’s contemporaneous log might be important in catching a culprit.

 

When selecting batches of early ballots for audit, the law requires that the selections be evenly distributed among all available scanners. It is therefore important for the early ballot observers to log which scanner was used for each batch of ballots. Although the law does not require it, you might want to also evenly distribute batches of ballots selected for audit among election department employees, so logging the names of scanner operators could also be useful.

 

In general, if you have any expectation of catching a crook, it may depend on knowing which person did what. Having the observer log this information in an orderly fashion might mean the difference between catching a crook and not catching a crook. Similarly, the discovery of defective scanning equipment may require knowing which scanner processed each batch of ballots and when, especially the ballots to be audited.

 

 

v.              Recording seal numbers used on computers, storage containers, rooms

 

Whenever observers depart from the ballot processing and ballot scanning areas, and whenever ballots or other election materials are placed in a locked vault or room overnight, it is important to place a tamper-revealing seal on the container or entrance so that observers can confirm before opening the container or entering the room for the next session that no improper access occurred during the time when observers were not present. You should test each seal location to be sure that (1) it is necessary to remove the seal in order to open or access the contents of the container or room, and (2) the seal will actually reveal such removal.

 

 

b.                   Analyzing the data

 

i.                 Comparing numbers of ballots at different stages of the election

 

If your observers log numbers of early ballots mailed out with numbers of early ballots returned and with numbers of early ballots scanned, it can confirm that no extra ballots were introduced into the counting process. The early ballot board should keep tabs on the numbers of ballots it processes.  When ballots are placed into an envelope or box, there should be clear notation of how many ballots are contained therein.

 

If the numbers of voters who signed in at each precinct is compared with the number of ballots scanned in that precinct, the totals should match. Additionally, the total number of voters on the precinct registers and on the early ballot logs should match the total number of votes reported for the election.

 

Any significant differences (greater than 1 percent) should be investigated to confirm that (1) no legitimate votes were lost, and (2) no fraudulent votes were added.

 

ii.               Comparing seal numbers from different stages of the election

 

If observers record seal numbers placed on boxes, envelopes, and other containers with the seal numbers on those containers when the next step of the ballot processing begins, you can confirm that no one had improper access to the ballots or computers during the storage or transport time. Any difference in seal numbers needs to be explained or investigated.

 

iii.             Looking for odd events (e.g., extra early reports, unneeded database actions)

 

After the election is completed, you can request a computer disk with the vote count software’s activity log and the computer operating system’s activity log. These logs can be examined for anomalous activities, such as printing more vote total reports than were logged in association with the selection of early ballots for audit, or backups of the vote count database at times other than the end of a processing day. Any odd activities can then be compared with observer logs for the corresponding time periods to better identify what happened.

 

iv.            Comparing early ballot numbers with precinct-cast ballot numbers

 

The percentage of voters who cast early ballots should generally be consistent from precinct to precinct. Similarly, the percentage of early voters in each race should also be consistent from precinct to precinct and from race to race. If you have data from previous elections, current data can also be compared with historical data to identify trends or anomalous data in the current election.

 

v.              Checking the database after the election is over

 

If you can obtain a copy of the computer database containing the vote totals after the completion of the election, it is possible to perform statistical analyses of the data in the database to confirm that all numbers are statistically consistent throughout, and that the numbers in the database are consistent with numbers obtained from other sources, such as voter registration rolls, precinct voter sign-in registers, precinct scanner totals, hand audit counts, etc.

 

If you cannot obtain a copy of the actual computer database, many statistical analyses can be performed using the text file of preliminary results obtained before the selection of precincts for the hand count audit or (better) using a similar text file containing final precinct-level results.

 

 

 

 


Appendix A


Appendix B: 2008 Election Calendar

 

Description of          Date Calculation

Calculated 2008 Date

Who is Responsible

Description

Statute

 

PPE-150

9/8/2007

GOV

Proclamation changing PPE date

16-241

 

ConE1-180

9/13/2007

BOS

Deadline for 180 day notice by Board of Supervisors for Consolidated 1 Election

16-205

 

PPE-93

11/4/2007

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Early Ballot **Uniformed service voters or overseas voters can request ballots and special write-in early ballots before this date

**16-542(A)(B)16-543.01

 

PPE-93

11/4/2007

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Continuing" Illness 16-549

*

 

PPE-90

11/7/2007

BOS

Accept List Submitted by Party Chairmen of Election Board Nominees

16-531(A)

 

PPE-80

11/17/2007

BOS

Post lists of polling places for all precincts, including polling place changes submitted to DOJ )

16-411(G

 

PPE-76

11/21/2007

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Challenges to Candidate Nomination Petitions

16-351

 

PPE-75

11/22/2007

BOS

Start preparation of submission to U.S. Justice Department of changes

**

 

PPE-75

11/22/2007

BOS

Schedule Classes for Precinct Election Boards 16-532

*

 

ConE2-180

11/22/2007

BOS

Deadline for 180 day notice by Board of Supervisors for Consolidated 2 Election

16-205

 

PPE-60

12/7/2007

BOS

Order Parts for Voting Devices

**

 

PPE-60

12/7/2007

REC

Accept List of Nominees for Special Election Boards from the County Party Chairmen

16-549

 

PPE-60

12/7/2007

SOS REC

Mail Certified Lists of all Candidates Qualified for Primary Election Ballot to Recorders to include with Special Write-in Early Ballots

16-543.01(C)

 

PPE-50

12/17/2007

BOS

Prepare Materials and Supplies for Classes of Instruction to Precinct Election Boards

6-532*

 

PPE-48

12/19/2007

BOS

Layout Ballot Pages and Master Rotation List (if rotation is required)

16-464*

 

PPE-46

12/21/2007

BOS

Allocate Voting Devices to Precincts

16-447*

 

PPE-45

12/22/2007

BOS

Begin instruction Classes for Precinct Election Boards

16-532

 

PPE-45

12/22/2007

BOS

Print Instructions and Check List for Election Board and Inspectors

16-532*

 

PPE-45

12/22/2007

ELEC

Prepare Proof of Sample Ballots and Submit to Each County Party Chairmen; Mail a Copy to each Candidate

16-461

 

PPE-44

12/23/2007

ELEC

Order Ballot Cards for PPE

16-508*

 

PPE-40

12/27/2007

BOS

Print Sample Ballots

16-461

 

PPE-40

12/27/2007

ELEC

Accept Suggestions from County Party Chairmen on Changes to Sample Ballot Due to Error or Omission

16-461

 

PPE-40

12/27/2007

SOS BOS

Perform Logic and Accuracy Tests before Early Voting for the Primary Election Begins for Accessible Voting System Units

16-449

 

PPE-40

12/27/2007

SOS ELEC CLK

Deadline for Write-in Candidate Nomination Papers for Primary Election at 5:00 p.m.

16-312

 

PPE-39

12/28/2007

BOS

Include List of Eligible Write-in Candidates in Supplies for Precinct Inspectors

16-312(C)

 

PPE-39

12/28/2007

SOS ELEC CLK

Deliver Notice of Write-in Candidates Filing Nomination Papers

16-312

 

 Jan 1

1/1/2008

SOS REC

January 1 Voter Registration Report

 

 

 Jan 1

1/1/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Public Officers Campaign Finance Reports

 

 

Jan 1 of GE year

1/1/2008

CAND CCEC

Begin Qualifying period for Candidates for Legislative Candidates

16-961

 

PPE-33

1/3/2008

ELEC

Begin Early Voting for PPE

16-545

 

PPE-33

1/3/2008

BOS

Print Early Ballots and Deliver to County Recorder

16-503, 16-545

 

PPE-33

1/3/2008

BOS

Print Ballots and Ballot Labels

16-405*, 16-466*, 16-503*, 16-545*

 

PPE-33

1/3/2008

REC

Print Instructions and Envelopes Needed for Early Voting

16-547*

 

PPE-33

1/3/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Early Ballots From Voters for Primary Election

16-545

 

PPE-33

1/3/2008

REC

Appoint Special Election Boards

16-549

 

 

1/4/2007

CCEC SOS

Begin Qualifying period for Candidates for Legislative Candidates

16-961

 

PPE-32

1/4/2008

BOS

Accept List Submitted by County Party Chairmen of Party Election Observers

16-590*

 

PPE-32

1/4/2008

BOS

Designate Locations for Central Counting Place Boards, Precinct Boards, Early Boards Data Processing Boards and Receiving Site Boards

16-608*

 

PPE-29

1/7/2008

BOS

Designate Locations for Receiving Sites, Central Counting Place, Computer Center and Early Processing Center

16-551*

 

PPE-29

1/7/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the PPE at midnight

16-120

 

PPE-29

1/7/2008

SOS REC

REC PPE Voter Registration Report

16-168(G)

 

PPE-29

1/7/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the PPE at midnight

6-120

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Lay out floor space for receiving sites, central counting place, computer center, and earlyprocessing center

**

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Print Official and Unofficial Return Envelopes

16-511*, 16-615*, 16-616*

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Ballot Labels Ready for Voting Devices

16-505*,16-466*

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Print Poll Lists

16-516*

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Print Challenge Lists and Payroll Vouchers

16-536*, 16-594*

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Print "No Smoking," "Vote Here," "Seventy-five Foot Limit", "Arrow," "Instructions to Voters and Election Officers" and "Right to Vote a Provisional Ballot" signs

16-513*, 16-513.01*, 16-515*, 16-563(2)*

 

PPE-25

1/11/2008

BOS

Print Duplicate Ballot Report Forms

16-608*

 

PPE-22

1/14/2008

BOS

Precinct Supplies on Hand

16-404*, 16-405*, 6-426*,16-447*,16-511-515*

 

PPE-22

1/14/2008

 

Inspection and testing of precinct machines (observers needed)

Pima

 

PPE-21

1/15/2008

REC

Deliver Complete Copies of Precinct Registers to County and State Party Chairmen

16-168

 

PPE-20

1/16/2008

BOS

Designate Polling Places (except for special district and mail ballot elections)

16-411(B)

 

PPE-20

1/16/2008

BOS

Appoint ALL Election Boards

16-531, 16-535,16-551

 

PPE-19

1/17/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing Pre-PPE Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PPE-19

1/17/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Pre-PPE Campaign Finanace Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

PPE-19

1/17/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing PPE Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

PPE-19

1/17/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee PPE Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

PPE-18

1/18/2008

BOS

Print Log Books and Forms for Receiving Sites, Central Counting Place, Computer Center and Early Ballot Processing Center

16-608*

 

PPE-18

1/18/2008

BOS

Outline Polling Place Support Plan for Election Day

**

 

PPE-14

1/22/2008

BOS SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for Primary Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

PPE-14

1/22/2008

BOS

Mail Notice to County Party Chairmen as to Time and Place when Voting Devices can be Inspected

16-447(B)*

 

PPE-14

1/22/2008

ELEC SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for PPE with Secretary of State

16-445

 

PPE-10 Business Days

1/22/2008

SOS BOS

Perform Logic and Accuracy Tests Ten Business days before PPE - Notify Public 48 hours in Advance 16-449

 

 

PPE-12

1/24/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Pre-PPE Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PPE-12

1/24/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Pre-PPE Campaign Finanace Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

PPE-12

1/24/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for PPE

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

PPE-12

1/24/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

PPE-12

1/24/2008

 

Begin processing early ballots (observers needed)

Pima

 

PPE-11

1/25/2008

BOS

Mail Sample Ballots

16-461

 

PPE-11

1/25/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Continuing" Illness at 5:00 p.m.

16-549

 

PPE-11

1/25/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Early Ballot

16-542(E)

 

PPE-11

1/25/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Early Ballots as a Result of an Emergency Occurring between 5:00 p.m. on ??? and 5:00 p.m. on ??? that would Prevent the Elector from Voting at the Polls

16-542(H)

 

PPE-10

1/26/2008

BOS

Assemble Precinct Kits, Supplies and Materials

16-404* 16-405*, 16-426*,16-447*,16-511-515*

 

PPE-10

1/26/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Unanticipated" Illness

16-549(D)

 

PPE-10

1/26/2008

REC

Prepare Official Precinct Registers

16-168

 

PPE-10

1/26/2008

REC

Provide Inactive Voter List to each Precinct

16-583*

 

PPE-7

1/29/2008

BOS

Complete Plans for Transfer to Alternate Computer Facility

**

 

PPE-7

1/29/2008

BOS

Complete Ballot and Supply Dispersal Plan

16-509*

 

PPE-7

1/29/2008

BOS

Complete Receiving Site Ballot Card Pick-up Plan

**

 

PPE-7

1/29/2008

 

Deliver list of hand-count audit workers to ELEC

Pima

 

PPE-5

1/31/2008

 

Begin scanning early ballots (observers needed)

Pima

 

 Jan 31

1/31/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Public Officers Annual Financial Disclosure Statement

38-542(D)

 

 Jan 31

1/31/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing January 31st Campaign Finance Report

16-913(C),16-916(D)

 

 Jan 31

1/31/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee January 31st Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

PPE-4

2/1/2008

REC

Deadline for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Recently Discharged or Separated from Employment to Register to Vote for the PPE at 5:00 p.m.

16-103

 

 Feb 1 (beginning of Feb)

2/1/2008

SOS PUB

Begin meetings with EPS

**

 

 Feb 1

2/1/2008

SOS

Begin bid process for printing publicity pamphlet

**

 

 Feb 2

2/1/2008

SOS

Begin entering text of ballot measures

**

 

 Feb 3

2/1/2008

SOS

Begin work with Spanish Translator for Ballot Measures

**

 

PPE-2

2/3/2008

BOS

If BOS Fails to Designate Polling Places, the Justice of the Pace may Designate Polling Places

16-411(C)

 

PPE-2

2/3/2008

BOS

Deliver Ballots to Inspector

16-509

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

BOS

Complete Instructional Classes for Precinct Boards, Receiving and Central Counting Place Boards and Data Processing Boards

16-532

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

BOS

Deliver Polling Place Supplies

16-404,16-447(D), 16-511*

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

BOS

Complete Post Election Supply and Materials Pick-up Plan

**

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

BOS

Complete Voter Education Program – Public Display of Voting Equipment

16-406

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

BOS

Deliver List of Qualified Write-in Candidates to Inspector to be Posted Election Day in Polling Place

16-312*

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Unanticipated" Illness

16-549(D)

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Early Ballots as a Result of an Emergency Occuring between 5:00 p.m. on ??? and 5:00 p.m. on ??? that would Prevent the Elector from Voting at the Polls

16-542(H)

 

PPE-1

2/4/2008

REC

Deliver List of all Electors who were Issued Early Ballots to Precinct Inspectors

16-550(C)

 

PPE 

2/5/2008

ALL

Presidential Preference Primary Election

16-201

 

PPE

2/5/2008

 REC

Continue Delivery of Early Ballots to Early Boards until 7:00 p.m.

16-551(C)

 

PPE

2/5/2008

REC

Deadline for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Residing Outside Arizona to Register to Vote for the Primary Election at 7:00 p.m.

16-103

 

PPE

2/5/2008

 

Hand-count audit (workers and observers needed)

Pima

 

ConE1-33

2/7/2008

ELEC

Begin Early Voting for the Consolidated Election 1

16-545

 

PPE+3 Business Days

2/8/2008

REC

Last day for Identification Verification for Conditional Provisional Ballots

16-579

 

PPE+4

2/9/2008

 

Tabulate ballots not counted on election day (observers needed)

Pima

 

PPE+6

2/11/2008

BOS

Deadline to Hear Early Ballot Challenges

16-552(E)

 

PPE+6

2/11/2008

BOS

First day to Canvass Returns and Issue Certificates of Election

16-642, 16-645

 

PPE+6

2/11/2008

CLK BOS

Deliver Certificates of Nomination

16-645

 

PPE+21

2/11/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing Post-PPE Report Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE1-29

2/11/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the Consolidated Election at midnight

6-120

 

PPE+5 business days

2/12/2008

REC

Process Provisional Ballots

16-135, 16-584(E)

 

PPE+10

2/15/2008

BOS

Deliver Canvass to Secretary of State

16-645

 

PPE+10

2/15/2008

BOS

Last day to Canvass Returns and Issue Certificates of Election

16-642, 16-645

 

January 31+2 weeks

2/15/2008

SOS

Send Notices of Failure to File for Public Officers Annual Financial Disclosure Statements

38-541, 38-542

 

PPE+13

2/18/2008

SOS

OFFICIAL CANVASS OF PPE - Issue Certificates of Nomination

16-645

 

PPE+16

2/21/2008

BOS

Voting Devices may be Unsealed

16-428

 

ConE1-19

2/21/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Consolidated 1 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE1-19

2/21/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Consolidated 1 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

PPE+21

2/26/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for PPE

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

PPE+21

2/26/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee PPE Post-Election Campaign Finanace Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

ConE1-14

2/26/2008

ELEC SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for Consolidated 1 Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

ConE1-12

2/28/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing March Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE1-12

2/28/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

 Mar 1

3/1/2008

REC

Place Voters in New Precincts

16-412

 

 Mar 1

3/1/2008

SOS ELEC

Calculate Candidate Signature Requirements

16-168(G), 16-322(B)

 

 Mar 1

3/1/2008

SOS REC

March 1 Voter Registration Report

16-168(G)

 

PPE+30

3/6/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-PPE Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PPE+30

3/6/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-PPE Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

PPE+30

3/6/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for PPE

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PPE+30

3/6/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for PPE

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

PE-180

3/6/2008

BOS

Deadline for 180 day notice by Board of Supervisors for Primary Election

16-205

 

PE-180

3/6/2008

REC

Deadline for Filing New Party Petitions to County Recorders for Signature Verification

16-803(B)

 

ConE3-180

3/13/2008

BOS

Deadline for 180 day notice by Board of Supervisors for Consolidated 3 Election

16-205

 

ConE1+21

4/1/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE1+21

4/1/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee March Post-Election Campaign Finanace Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

ConE1+30

4/10/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

ConE1+30

4/10/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

ConE2-33

4/17/2008

ELEC

Begin Early Voting for the Consolidated Election 2

16-545

 

ConE2-29

4/21/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the Consolidated Election at midnight

6-120

 

PE-140

4/15/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing New Party Petitions for Primary Election with Secretary of State

16-803

 

ConE2-19

5/1/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Consolidated 2 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE2-19

5/1/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Consolidated 2 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

ConE2-19

5/1/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing May Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report covering

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE2-19

5/1/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee May Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

 May 1

5/1/2008

SOS PUB

Assign Proposition Numbers to Referenda sent by legislature / Begin Spanish translations

**

 

ConE2-14

5/6/2008

ELEC SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for Consolidated 2 Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

ConE2-12

5/8/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee May Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

ConE2-12

5/8/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing March Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 2 Election

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

 May 6

5/6/2008

SOS

PUB Begin drafting Yes/No & descriptive title language

**

 

ConE4-180

5/8/2008

BOS

Deadline for 180 day notice by Board of Supervisors for Consolidated 4 Election

16-205

 

GE-180

5/8/2008

BOS

Deadline for 180 day notice by Board of Supervisors for General Election

16-205

 

PE-120

5/5/2008

SOS

Send notice to Board of Supervisors of the state and federal offices for which candidates are to be nominated at the Primary Election

16-202

 

 May 31

5/31/2008

SOS

PUB Meet with Tri-County Navajo Outreach Workers

**

 

 Jun 1

6/1/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing June 30 Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

PE-100

5/25/2008

ELEC

Order ballot Cards for Primary Election

16-508*

 

ConE2+21

6/10/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 2 Election

 

 

ConE2+21

6/10/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 2 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

PE-93

6/1/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Early Ballot **Uniformed service voters or overseas voters can request ballots and special write-in early ballots before this date

**16-542(A)(B)16-543.01

 

PE-93

6/1/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Continuing" Illness 16-549

*

 

PE-90

6/4/2008

BOS

Accept List Submitted by Party Chairmen of Election Board Nominees

16-531(A)

 

PE-90

6/4/2008

SOS

Deadline for Accepting Partisan Nomination Petitions and Paper

16-311,16-314, 16-905, 38-541

 

PE-90

6/4/2008

SOS

Deadline for Accepting "Nomination other than by Primary" Nomination Petitions and Paper

16-341

 

ConE2+30

6/19/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

ConE2+30

6/19/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 4 Election

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PE-80

6/14/2008

BOS

Post lists of polling places for all precincts, including polling place changes submitted to DOJ )

16-411(G

 

PE-76

6/18/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Challenges to Candidate Nomination Petitions

16-351

 

PE-75

6/19/2008

BOS

Start preparation of submission to U.S. Justice Department of changes

**

 

PE-75

6/19/2008

BOS

Schedule Classes for Precinct Election Boards 16-532

*

 

 Jun 30

6/30/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing June 30 Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

PE-68

6/26/2008

CCEC SOS

Deadline to File Participating Candidate's Application to Receive Funds and Qualifying Contributions Report with Original Slips to Secretary of State

16-950(B)

 

GE-(4 months and1 day)

7/3/2008

SOS PUB

Assign Remaining Proposition Numbers

**

 

GE-(4 months and1 day)

7/3/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Initiative Petitions with the Secretary of State

Const. Art. IV §1(4)

 

 Jul 8

7/8/2008

SOS PUB

Submit Yes/No and descriptive title language to Attorney General

**

 

GE-120

7/7/2008

ELEC

Begin Accepting Nonpartisan Candidate Nomination Petitions and Papers

16-311(B)

 

PE-60

7/4/2008

BOS

Order Parts for Voting Devices

**

 

PE-60

7/4/2008

REC

Accept List of Nominees for Special Election Boards from the County Party Chairmen

16-549

 

PE-60

7/4/2008

SOS PUB

Deadline for arguments filed for or against initiative measures or constitutional amendments /Leg. Council Analysis / JLBC Economic Impact Summaries

19-124(A)(B) 19-123(A)6

 

PE-60

7/4/2008

SOS PUB

Send Yes/No and Descriptive Titles to Spanish and Navajo Translators

**

 

PE-60

7/4/2008

SOS REC

Mail Certified Lists of all Candidates Qualified for Primary Election Ballot to Recorders to include with Special Write-in Early Ballots

16-543.01(C)

 

 Jul 15

7/15/2008

SOS PUB

Receive registered voter data from 15 counties

*

 

(PE-9 weeks) +1 day

7/7/2008

CCEC 

Begin CCEC Primary Election Period

16-961(B)(4)

 

(PE-9 weeks) +1 day

7/7/2008

CCEC

Clean Election Commission Payment to Qualified Participating Candidates

16-951(A)

 

PE-50

7/14/2008

BOS

Prepare Materials and Supplies for Classes of Instruction to Precinct Election Boards

6-532*

 

 Jul 24

7/24/2008

SOS PUB

Receive Judicial Performance Review Information (camera-ready)

**

 

PE-48

7/16/2008

BOS

Layout Ballot Pages and Master Rotation List (if rotation is required)

16-464*

 

PE-46

7/18/2008

BOS

Allocate Voting Devices to Precincts

16-447*

 

PE-45

7/19/2008

BOS

Begin instruction Classes for Precinct Election Boards

16-532

 

PE-45

7/19/2008

BOS

Print Instructions and Check List for Election Board and Inspectors

16-532*

 

PE-45

7/19/2008

ELEC

Prepare Proof of Sample Ballots and Submit to Each County Party Chairmen; Mail a Copy to each Candidate

16-461

 

PE-44

7/20/2008

ELEC

Order Ballot Cards for Primary Election

16-508*

 

 Jul 30

7/30/2008

SOS PUB

Receive Spanish translations from translator (as completed)

**

 

PE-40

7/24/2008

BOS

Print Sample Ballots

16-461

 

PE-40

7/24/2008

ELEC

Accept Suggestions from County Party Chairmen on Changes to Sample Ballot Due to Error or Omission

16-461

 

PE-40

7/24/2008

SOS BOS

Perform Logic and Accuracy Tests before Early Voting for the Primary Election Begins for Accessible Voting System Units

16-449

 

PE-40

7/24/2008

SOS ELEC CLK

Deadline for Write-in Candidate Nomination Papers for Primary Election at 5:00 p.m.

16-312

 

PPE+180

8/3/2008

SOS BOS

Return Computer Program filed for the PPE Election

16-445(E)

 

PE-39

7/25/2008

BOS

Include List of Eligible Write-in Candidates in Supplies for Precinct Inspectors

16-312(C)

 

PE-39

7/25/2008

SOS ELEC CLK

Deliver Notice of Write-in Candidates Filing Nomination Papers

16-312

 

GE-93

8/3/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Continuing" Illness

16-549

 

GE-93

8/3/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Early Ballot ,**Uniformed service voters or overseas voters can request ballots and special write-in early ballots before this date**

16-542(A)(B) 16-543.01

 

GE-90

8/6/2008

BOS

Accept Lists Submitted by Party Chairmen of Election Board Nominees

16-531(A)

 

GE-90

8/6/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Accepting Nonpartisan Candidate Nomination Petitions and Papers

16-311(B)

 

GE-90

8/6/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Accepting Supreme, Appellate and Superior Court Judges Retention Papers

Const. Art. VI, § 38

 

PE-33

7/31/2008

BOS

Print Early Ballots and Deliver to County Recorder

16-503, 16-545

 

PE-33

7/31/2008

BOS

Print Ballots and Ballot Labels

16-405*, 16-466*, 16-503*, 16-545*

 

PE-33

7/31/2008

REC

Print Instructions and Envelopes Needed for Early Voting

16-547*

 

PE-33

7/31/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Early Ballots From Voters for Primary Election

16-545

 

PE-33

7/31/2008

REC

Appoint Special Election Boards

16-549

 

ConE3-33

8/7/2008

ELEC

Begin Early Voting for the Consolidated Election 3

16-545

 

PE-32

8/1/2008

BOS

Accept List Submitted by County Party Chairmen of Party Election Observers

16-590*

 

PE-32

8/1/2008

BOS

Designate Locations for Central Counting Place Boards, Precinct Boards, Early Boards Data Processing Boards and Receiving Site Boards

16-608*

 

 Aug 10

8/10/2008

SOS PUB

Receive Spanish translations from translator (as completed)

**

 

PE-29

8/4/2008

BOS

Designate Locations for Receiving Sites, Central Counting Place, Computer Center and Early Processing Center

16-551*

 

PE-29

8/4/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the Primary Election at midnight

16-120

 

PE-29

8/4/2008

SOS

REC Primary Election Voter Registration Report

16-168(G)

 

ConE3-29

8/11/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the Consolidated Election at midnight

6-120

 

 Aug 15

8/15/2008

SOS

PUB Send camera-ready pamphlet to printer (English)

**

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Lay out floor space for receiving sites, central counting place, computer center, and earlyprocessing center

**

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Print Official and Unofficial Return Envelopes

16-511*, 16-615*, 16-616*

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Ballot Labels Ready for Voting Devices

16-505*,16-466*

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Print Poll Lists

16-516*

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Print Challenge Lists and Payroll Vouchers

16-536*, 16-594*

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Print "No Smoking," "Vote Here," "Seventy-five Foot Limit", "Arrow," "Instructions to Voters and Election Officers" and "Right to Vote a Provisional Ballot" signs

16-513*, 16-513.01*, 16-515*, 16-563(2)*

 

PE-25

8/8/2008

BOS

Print Duplicate Ballot Report Forms

16-608*

 

GE-80

8/16/2008

BOS

Post lists of polling places for all precincts, including polling place changes submitted to DOJ

16-411(G)

 

PE-22

8/11/2008

BOS

Precinct Supplies on Hand

16-404*, 16-405*, 6-426*,16-447*,16-511-515*

 

PE-22

8/11/2008

Pima

Inspection and testing of precinct machines (observers needed)

 

 

PE-21

8/12/2008

REC

Deliver Complete Copies of Precinct Registers to County and State Party Chairmen

16-168

 

PE-20

8/13/2008

BOS

Designate Polling Places (except for special district and mail ballot elections)

16-411(B)

 

PE-20

8/13/2008

BOS

Appoint ALL Election Boards

16-531, 16-535,16-551

 

PE-19

8/14/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing Pre-Primary Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PE-19

8/14/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Pre-Primary Campaign Finanace Report covering

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

ConE3-19

8/21/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Consolidated 3 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE3-19

8/21/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Consolidated 3 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

GE-75

8/21/2008

BOS

Schedule Classes for Precinct Election Boards

16-532*

 

GE-75

8/21/2008

CCEC

Deadline for Filing Application for Certification as a Participating Candidate in Clean Elections Form with the Secretary of State

16-947(A)

 

GE-75

8/21/2008

SOS CCEC

End of Qualifying Period for Statewide Candidates for 2006 Election

16-961(B)(3)

 

GE-75

8/21/2008

SOS CCEC

End of Qualifying Period for Legislative Candidates for 2006 Election

16-961(B)(3)

 

 Aug 23

8/23/2008

SOS

PUB Printer returns proofs to SOS (English)

**

 

PE-18

8/15/2008

BOS

Print Log Books and Forms for Receiving Sites, Central Counting Place, Computer Center and Early Ballot Processing Center

16-608*

 

PE-18

8/15/2008

BOS

Outline Polling Place Support Plan for Election Day

**

 

 Aug 26

8/26/2008

SOS PUB SOS

Return signed-off proofs to printer / send Spanish and large print camera-ready pamphlets to printer

**

 

PE-14

8/19/2008

BOS SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for Primary Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

PE-14

8/19/2008

BOS

Mail Notice to County Party Chairmen as to Time and Place when Voting Devices can be Inspected

16-447(B)*

 

PE-10 Business Days

8/19/2008

SOS BOS

Perform Logic and Accuracy Tests Ten Business days before Primary Election - Notify Public 48 hours in Advance 16-449

 

 

ConE3-14

8/26/2008

ELEC SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for Consolidated 3 Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

PE-12

8/21/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Pre-Primary Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PE-12

8/21/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Pre-Primary Campaign Finanace Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

ConE3-12

8/28/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing March Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 3 Election

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

PE-12

8/21/2008

Pima

Begin processing early ballots (observers needed)

 

 

PE-11

8/22/2008

BOS

Mail Sample Ballots

16-461

 

PE-11

8/22/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Continuing" Illness at 5:00 p.m.

16-549

 

PE-11

8/22/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Early Ballot

16-542(E)

 

PE-11

8/22/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Early Ballots as a Result of an Emergency that would Prevent the Elector from Voting at the Polls

16-542(H)

 

PE-10

8/23/2008

BOS

Assemble Precinct Kits, Supplies and Materials

16-404* 16-405*, 16-426*,16-447*,16-511-515*

 

PE-10

8/23/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Unanticipated" Illness

16-549(D)

 

PE-10

8/23/2008

REC

Prepare Official Precinct Registers

16-168

 

PE-10

8/23/2008

REC

Provide Inactive Voter List to each Precinct

16-583*

 

 Sep 2

9/2/2008

SOS PUB

Receive Navajo translations from translator / send to vendor for duplication

**

 

 Sep 2

9/2/2008

SOS PUB

Provide registered voter mailing list data to printer

**

 

 Sep 2

9/2/2008

SOS PUB

Printer returns proofs to SOS (Spanish and large print)

**

 

PE-7

8/26/2008

BOS

Complete Plans for Transfer to Alternate Computer Facility

**

 

PE-7

8/26/2008

BOS

Complete Ballot and Supply Dispersal Plan

16-509*

 

PE-7

8/26/2008

BOS

Complete Receiving Site Ballot Card Pick-up Plan

**

 

PE-7

8/26/2008

Pima

Deliver list of hand-count audit workers to ELEC

 

 

PE-5

8/28/2008

Pima

Begin scanning early ballots (observers needed)

 

 

PE-4

8/29/2008

REC

Deadline for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Recently Discharged or Separated from Employment to Register to Vote for the Primary Election at 5:00 p.m.

16-103

 

GE-60

9/5/2008

REC

Accept List of Nominees for Special Election Boards from the County Party Chairmen

16-549

 

GE-60

9/5/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Accepting Supreme, Appellate and Superior Court Judges Retention Papers

Const. Art. VI, § 38

 

PE-2

8/31/2008

BOS

If BOS Fails to Designate Polling Places, the Justice of the Peace may Designate Polling Places

16-411(C)

 

PE-2

8/31/2008

BOS

Deliver Ballots to Inspector

16-509

 

ConE1+180

9/7/2008

SOS ELEC

Return Computer Program filed for the Consolidated 1 Election

16-445(E)

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

BOS

Complete Instructional Classes for Precinct Boards, Receiving and Central Counting Place Boards and Data Processing Boards

16-532

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

BOS

Deliver Polling Place Supplies

16-404,16-447(D), 16-511*

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

BOS

Complete Post Election Supply and Materials Pick-up Plan

**

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

BOS

Complete Voter Education Program – Public Display of Voting Equipment

16-406

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

BOS

Deliver List of Qualified Write-in Candidates to Inspector to be Posted Election Day in Polling Place

16-312*

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Unanticipated" Illness

16-549(D)

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Early Ballots as a Result of an Emergency that would Prevent the Elector from Voting at the Polls

16-542(H)

 

PE-1

9/1/2008

REC

Deliver List of all Electors who were Issued Early Ballots to Precinct Inspectors

16-550(C)

 

PE 

9/2/2008

ALL

Primary Election

16-201

 

PE

9/2/2008

CCEC

End of CCEC Primary Election Period

16-961(B)(4)

 

PE

9/2/2008

 REC

Continue Delivery of Early Ballots to Early Boards until 7:00 p.m.

16-551(C)

 

PE

9/2/2008

REC

Deadline for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Residing Outside Arizona to Register to Vote for the Primary Election at 7:00 p.m.

16-103

 

PE

9/2/2008

Pima

Hand-count audit (workers and observers needed)

 

 

PE+1

9/3/2008

CCEC

Candidates to Return Monies above Sufficient Amount to Pay Unpaid Bills During Primary Election Period

16-953(A)

 

PE+1

9/3/2008

CCEC

Begin CCEC General Election Period

16-961(B)(5)

 

PE+1

9/3/2008

CCEC

Clean Election Commission Payment to Qualified Participating Candidates

16-951(C)

 

PE+3 Business Days

9/5/2008

REC

Last day for Identification Verification for Conditional Provisional Ballots

16-579

 

Mid-September (9/10-9/25)

9/15/2008

SOS PUB

Meet with Tri-County Navajo Outreach workers (distribute Navajo language tape-recordings)

**

 

PE+4

9/6/2008

Pima

Tabulate ballots not counted on election day (observers needed)

 

 

16-Sep

9/16/2008

SOS PUB

Begin Town Halls Re: Ballot measures

*

 

PE+6

9/8/2008

BOS

Deadline to Hear Early Ballot Challenges

16-552(E)

 

PE+6

9/8/2008

BOS

First day to Canvass Returns and Issue Certificates of Election

16-642, 16-645

 

PE+6

9/8/2008

CLK BOS

Deliver Certificates of Nomination

16-645

 

PE+21

9/15/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing Post-Primary Report Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

GE-50

9/15/2008

BOS

Voting device parts on hand

**

 

GE-50

9/15/2008

BOS

Prepare Materials and Supplies for Classes of Instruction to Precinct Election Boards

16-532*

 

GE-50

9/15/2008

SOS REC

Mail Certified Lists of all Candidates Qualified for General Election Ballot to Recorders to include with Special Write-in Early Ballots

16-543.01(C)

 

PE+5 business days

9/9/2008

REC

Process Provisional Ballots

16-135, 16-584(E)

 

GE-48

9/17/2008

BOS

Layout Ballot Pages and Master Rotation List (if rotation is required)

16-502

 

PE+10

9/12/2008

BOS

Deliver Canvass to Secretary of State

16-645

 

GE-45

9/20/2008

BOS

Prepare Proof of Sample Ballots and Submit to Each County Party Chairmen; Mail a Copy to each Candidate whose Name did not Appear on the Primary Election Ballot

16-510*

 

GE-45

9/20/2008

BOS

Begin instruction Classes for Precinct Election Boards

16-532

 

GE-45

9/20/2008

BOS

Print Instructions and Check List for Election Board and Inspectors

16-532*

 

 Sep 23

9/23/2008

SOS PUB

Printer delivers "extra" English & Spanish pamphlets to SOS & Counties / mails pamphlets to voter households

**

 

PE+13

9/15/2008

SOS

OFFICIAL CANVASS OF PRIMARY ELECTION Canvass Returns of all Statewide or Legislative Offices - Issue Certificates of Nomination

16-645

 

GE-43*

9/22/2008

SOS

Mail Publicity Pamphlet to every Household that Contains a Registered Voter

19-123(B)*

 

PE+16

9/18/2008

BOS

Voting Devices may be Unsealed

16-428

 

GE-40

9/25/2008

BOS

Accept Suggestions from County Party Chairmen on Changes to Sample Ballot Due to Error or Omission

16-510*

 

GE-40

9/25/2008

SOS BOS

Perform Logic and Accuracy Tests before Early Voting for General Election Begins for Accessible Voting System Units

16-449

 

GE-40

9/25/2008

SOS ELEC CLK

Deadline for Write-in Candidate Nomination Papers for General Election at 5:00 p.m.

16-312

 

GE-39

9/26/2008

BOS

Include List of Eligible Write-in Candidates in Supplies for Precinct Inspectors

16-312

 

GE-39

9/26/2008

SOS ELEC CLK

Deliver Notice of Write-in Candidates Filing Nomination Papers

16-312

 

GE-36

9/29/2008

BOS

Allocate Voting Devices to Precincts

16-447*

 

ConE3+21

9/30/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 3 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

ConE3+30

9/30/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

ConE4-33

10/2/2008

ELEC

Begin Early Voting for the Consolidated Election

16-545

 

GE-33

10/2/2008

BOS

Print Early Ballots and Deliver to County Recorder

16-503, 16-545

 

GE-33

10/2/2008

BOS

Print Ballots and Ballot Labels

16-405*, 16-466*, 16-503*,16-545*

 

GE-33

10/2/2008

REC

Print Instructions and Envelopes Needed for Early Voting

16-547*

 

GE-33

10/2/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Early Ballots from Voters for General Election

16-545

 

GE-33

10/2/2008

REC

Appoint Special Election Boards

16-549*

 

GE-32

10/3/2008

BOS

Accept List Submitted by County Party Chairmen of Party Election Observers

16-590*

 

GE-32

10/3/2008

BOS

Designate Locations for Central Counting Place Boards, Precinct Boards, Early Boards Data Processing Boards and Receiving Site Boards

16-608*

 

GE-30

10/5/2008

GOV

Issuance of Proclamation for General Election by Governor

16-214

 

 Oct 7

10/7/2008

SOS PUB

End Town Halls Re: Ballot measures

*

 

ConE4-29

10/6/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the Consolidated Election at midnight

6-120

 

GE-29

10/6/2008

BOS

Designate Locations for Receiving Sites, Central Counting Place, Computer Center and Early Processing Center

16-551*

 

GE-29

10/6/2008

REC

Last day to Register to Vote for the General Election at midnight

16-120

 

GE-29

10/6/2008

SOS REC

General Election Voter Registration Report

16-168(G)

 

PE+30

10/2/2008

CCEC

Candidates Shall Pay Uncontested / Unpaid Bills from Primary Election

16-953(C)

 

PE+30

10/2/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-Primary Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

PE+30

10/2/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-Primary Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Print Challenge Lists and Payroll Vouchers

16-536*, 16-594*

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Ballot Labels Ready for Voting Devices

16-405*, 16-466*, 16-506*

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Print Poll Lists

16-516*

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Receive Election Proclamation by Governor

16-214

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Print Official and Unofficial Return Envelopes

16-511*, 16-615*, 16-616*

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Print Duplicate Ballot Report Forms

16-608*

 

GE-25

10/10/2008

BOS

Print "No Smoking," "Vote Here," "Seventy-five Foot Limit", "Arrow," "Instructions to Voters and Election Officers" and "Right to Vote a Provisional Ballot" signs

16-513*, 16-513.01*, 16-515*,16-563(2)*

 

GE-22

10/13/2008

BOS

Confirm or Rearrange (as a result of Primary Election) Layout floor space for receiving sites, central counting place, computer center, and early processing center

**

 

GE-22

10/13/2008

BOS

Precinct Supplies on Hand

16-404*, 16-405*, 16-426*, 16-447*,16-511-515*

 

GE-22

10/13/2008

Pima

Inspection and testing of precinct machines (observers needed)

 

 

GE-20

10/15/2008

BOS

Designate Polling Places (except for special district and mail ballot elections)

16-411(B)

 

GE-20

10/15/2008

BOS

Appoint ALL Election Boards

16-531, 16-535, 16-551

 

ConE4-19

10/16/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Consolidated 4 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE4-19

10/16/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Consolidated 4 Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

1/1/all

10/6/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Public Officers Campaign Finance Reports

 

 

GE-19

10/16/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing Pre-General Report Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

GE-19

10/16/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Pre-General Report Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

GE-18

10/17/2008

BOS

Print Log Books and Forms for Receiving Sites, Central Counting Place, Computer Center and Early Ballot Processing Center

16-608*

 

GE-18

10/17/2008

BOS

Outline Polling Place Support Plan for Election Day

**

 

ConE4-14

10/21/2008

ELEC SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for Consolidated 4 Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

GE-14

10/21/2008

BOS SOS

File Computer Program and Voting Equipment Certification for General Election with Secretary of State

16-445

 

GE-14

10/21/2008

BOS

Mail Notice to County Party Chairmen as to Time and Place when Voting Devices can be Inspected

16-447(B)*

 

GE-10 Business Days

10/21/2008

SOS BOS

Perform Logic and Accuracy Tests Ten Business days before General Election - Notify Public 48 hours in Advance

16-449

 

ConE4-12

10/23/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing March Pre-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 4 Election

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

GE-12

10/23/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Pre-General Report Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

GE-12

10/23/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Pre-General Report Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

GE-12

10/23/2008

Pima

Begin processing early ballots (observers needed)

 

 

GE-11

10/24/2008

BOS

Mail Sample Ballot to every Household that Contains a Registered Voter

16-510(C)

 

GE-11

10/24/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Continuing" Illness at 5:00 p.m.

16-549

 

GE-11

10/24/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Early Ballot

16-542(E)

 

GE-11

10/24/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Early Ballots as a Result of an Emergency Occuring that would Prevent the Elector from Voting at the Polls

16-542(H)

 

GE-10

10/25/2008

 BOS

Publication of Election Proclamation made by Governor

16-214(C)

 

GE-10

10/25/2008

BOS

Assemble Precinct Kits, Supplies and Materials

16-404*, 16-405*, 16-426*,16-447*,16-511-515*

 

GE-10

10/25/2008

BOS

Ballot Pages Printed and Ready for Inspection

16-503(A)

 

GE-10

10/25/2008

REC

Begin Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Unanticipated Illness

16-549(D)

 

GE-10

10/25/2008

REC

Prepare Official Precinct Registers

16-168

 

GE-10

10/25/2008

REC

Provide Inactive Voter List to each Precinct

16-583*

 

GE-7

10/28/2008

BOS

Complete Ballot and Supply Dispersal Plan

16-509*

 

GE-7

10/28/2008

BOS

Complete Plans for Transfer to Alternate Computer Facility

**

 

GE-7

10/28/2008

BOS

Complete Receiving Site Ballot Card Pick-up Plan

**

 

GE-7

10/28/2008

 

Deliver list of hand-count audit workers to ELEC

 

 

GE-50

10/30/2008

Pima

Begin scanning early ballots (observers needed)

 

 

GE-4

10/31/2008

REC

Deadline for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Recently Discharged or Separated from Employment to Register to Vote for the General Election at 5:00 p.m.

16-103

 

GE-2

11/2/2008

BOS

If BOS Fails to Designate Polling Places, the Justice of the Peace may Designate Polling Places

16-411(C)

 

GE-2

11/2/2008

BOS

Deliver Ballots to Inspector

16-509

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

BOS

Complete Instructional Classes for Precinct Boards, Receiving and Central Counting Place Boards and Data Processing Boards

16-532

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

BOS

Deliver Polling Place Supplies

16-404, 16-447(D), 16-511*

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

BOS

Deliver List of Qualified Write-in Candidates to Inspector to be Posted Election Day in Polling Place

16-312*

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

BOS

Complete Post Election Supply and Materials Pick-up Plan

**

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

BOS

Complete Voter Education Program – Public Display of Voting Equipment

16-406

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Assistance by Special Election Board due to "Unanticipated Illness

16-549(D)

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

REC

Deadline for Accepting Requests for Early Ballots as a Result of an Emergency Occuring that would Prevent the Elector from Voting at the Polls

16-542(H)

 

GE-1

11/3/2008

REC

Deliver List of all Electors who were Issued Early Ballots to Precinct Inspectors

16-550(C)

 

GE

11/4/2008

ALL

General Election

16-211

 

GE

11/4/2008

BOS

Complete Central Counting Place Set-up and Furnish Supplies

16-621

 

GE

11/4/2008

CCEC

End of CCEC General Election Period

16-961(B)(5)

 

GE

11/4/2008

REC

Continue Delivery of Early Ballots to Early Boards until 7:00 p.m.

16-551(C)

 

GE

11/4/2008

REC

Deadline for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Residing Outside Arizona to Register to Vote for the General Election at 7:00 p.m.

16-103

 

GE

11/4/2008

Pima

Hand-count audit (workers and observers needed)

 

 

GE+1

11/5/2008

CCEC

Candidates to Return Monies above Sufficient Amount to Pay Unpaid Bills During General Election Period

16-953(B)

 

GE+1

11/5/2008

SOS CCEC

Begin Exploratory Period for Statewide Candidates for 2008 Election

16-961(B)2

 

GE+1

11/5/2008

SOS CCEC

Begin Exploratory Period for Legislative Candidates for 2008 Election

16-961(B)2

 

ConE2+180

11/16/2008

SOS ELEC

Return Computer Program filed for the Consolidated 2 Election

16-445(E)

 

GE+4

11/8/2008

Pima

Tabulate ballots not counted on election day (observers needed)

 

 

PE+21

11/10/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Post-Primary Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

GE+6

11/10/2008

BOS

Deadline to Hear Early Ballot Challenges

16-552(E)

 

GE+6

11/10/2008

BOS

First day to Canvass Returns and Issue Certificates of Election

16-642, 16-645

 

GE+6

11/10/2008

CLK BOS

Deliver Certificates of Election

16-647

 

GE+5 Business Days

11/11/2008

REC

Last day for Identification Verification for Conditional Provisional Ballots

16-579

 

GE+10

11/14/2008

REC

Process Provisional Ballots

16-135, 16-584(E)

 

GE+15

11/19/2008

BOS

Last day to Canvass Returns and Issue Certificates of Election

16-642, 16-645

 

GE+21

11/20/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Post-General Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

GE+16

11/20/2008

BOS

Voting Devices may be Unsealed

16-428

 

GE+20

11/24/2008

GOV

Proclamation on Constitutional Amendments and Measures by Governor

6-651*

 

GE+20

11/24/2008

SOS

OFFICIAL CANVASS OF GENERAL ELECTION Canvass Returns of all Statewide or Legislative Offices - Issue Certificates of Election

16-648, 16-650

 

ConE4+21

11/25/2008

SOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 4 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

ConE4+21

11/25/2008

ELEC

Begin Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 4 Election

 

 

GE+21

11/25/2008

SOS ELEC

Begin Filing Post-General Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

ConE+30

12/4/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing March Post-Election Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

ConE4+30

12/4/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 1 Election

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

GE+30

12/4/2008

CCEC C

Candidates Shall Pay Uncontested / Unpaid Bills from General Election

16-953(C)

 

GE+30

12/4/2008

SOS ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-General Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B), 16-916(D)

 

GE+30

12/4/2008

SOS

Deadline for Filing Standing Committee Post-General Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K),16-916(D)

 

ConE4+30

12/4/2008

ELEC

Deadline for Filing Post-Election Campaign Finance Report for Consolidated 4 Election

16-913(B),16-916(D)

 

Jan 1 of GE +1 year

1/1/2009

CAND

Begin Filing January 31st Campaign Finance Report

16-913

 

Jan 1 of GE +1 year

1/1/2009

SOS BOS

Begin Filing Standing Committee January 31st Campaign Finance Report

16-913(B)(C)(K), 16-916(D)

 

Year after year of service (Jan1-Jan31)

1/1/2009

SOS

File Public Officers Annual Financial Disclosure Statement

38-541, 38-542

 

PE+180

3/1/2009

SOS BOS

Return Computer Program filed for the Primary Election

16-445(E)

 

GE+180

5/3/2009

SOS BOS

Return Computer Program filed for the General Election

16-445(E)

 

Aug 1 of GE year

8/1/2008

CAND CCEC

Begin Qualifying period for Candidates for Statewide Office Candidates

 

 

Date of filing for nomination

Filing Date

SOS

File Additional Public Officers Annual Financial Disclosure Statement

38-541, 38-542

 

Within 60 of filling vacancy

Vacancy +60 days

SOS

File Public Officers Annual Financial Disclosure Statement

38-541, 38-542

 

ConE3+180

3/8/2009

SOS ELEC

Return Computer Program filed for the Consolidated 3 Election

16-445(E)

 

ConE4+180

5/3/2009

SOS ELEC

Return Computer Program filed for the Consolidated 4 Election

16-445(E)

 

 


Appendix C: County Chair Election Integrity Checklist

 

 

Date Election           Event/Task

 

                        _____  Review election with County Election Director

_____  Obtain list of poll workers from County

_____  Review, change, add to list of poll workers

_____  Obtain lists of active and inactive voters

_____  Spot-check voter lists to confirm accuracy

_____  Deliver list of poll worker changes and additions

_____-90 days            List of election workers due                           

_____  Appoint L&A representatives, observers

                        _____  Appoint early ballot processing observers

                        _____  Appoint early ballot scanning observers

                        _____ Appoint coordinator for early ballot observers

                        _____  Appoint coordinator for poll watchers, hotline

                        _____  Appoint coordinator for hand-count auditors

                        _____  Schedule training for observers, poll watchers

                        _____  Deliver list of election observers

_____-32 days            List of party election observers due               

_____-2 weeks            Logic & Accuracy testing                   

                        _____  Request post-election copies of election reports and files

                        _____  Appoint poll watchers

                        _____  Deliver list of hand-count auditors

_____-1 week             List of hand count auditors due                       

_____                          Begin scanning early ballots

                        _____  Select batches of early ballots for audit

_____                          Election Day

                        _____  Obtain precinct-level vote totals on computer disk                        

_____                          Hand-count audit

                        _____  Select precincts and races to be audited

                        _____  Select boxes of early ballots to be audited

_____                          County completes counting votes

                        _____  Obtain post-election reports and files

                        _____  Review election reports, confirm validity of election

_____+10 days            Official Canvass of Election

                        _____  Review election with County Election Director                              


Appendix D: Observer Guidelines

 

These one-page outlines are intended as sample guideline handouts for the various central count observers, to explain what it is they are observing, what sorts of problems to look for, and what data might be useful to record. In appendix E, there are some sample data collection forms for some observers to use in collecting information to used after the election to review and research integrity issues.

 

Guidelines are included here for:

 

  1. Accuracy Certification Board Observers
  2. Early Board Observers
  3. Duplication Board Observers
  4. Early Ballot Scanning Observers
  5. Receiving Board Observers
  6. Inspection Board Observers
  7. Provisional Board Observers
  8. Write-in Board Observers
  9. Audit Board Observers

 


  1. Accuracy Certification Board Observer Guidelines

 

This board may also be called the Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Board, and on election night may additionally serve as a Snag Board. Its members typically will be paid a stipend by the County Election Department for their service. The Board should include a representative (or two) from each recognized political party.

 

The Accuracy Certification Board observes the Secretary of State’s logic and accuracy tests, conducts its own logic and accuracy tests on central count scanners and on a sampling of precinct scanners, both before and after the election. The Board will also observe the loading of precinct results into the central computer on election night, and will observe ballot scanning in the days after the election. The function of the Snag Board is to make joint party decisions on how election department personnel should handle odd cases not clearly defined in the Secretary of State’s election manual.

 

Problems that probably will occur on election night include:

n     precinct voting machines returned with broken seals,

n     precinct voting machines not returned at all,

n     precinct results not uploaded to the central computer,

n     unreadable or jammed tapes in the precinct voting machines,

 

Other issues that might arise on election night include:

n     unauthorized people being admitted to the secure counting facility,

n     public observers being refused an opportunity to observe the process,

n     unauthorized computers (laptops) in use in the secure counting facility,

n     breakdown of either the central computer or its bank of modems,

n     power failures

n     bomb scares

 

The general rule is that the Accuracy Certification Board members should be in the central count room whenever anyone is in the room.  If they are asked to leave for any reason, all election department personnel should also leave the room and lock the doors so that no one can gain access while the Board is absent.

 

If you are an observer of this activity, you have no standing to criticize the process – only to observe. You are entitled to ask questions, if you can find someone in authority with time to answer them without your interfering with the process. Keep in mind that there will be a lot of activity and people will be quite busy.

 

You should carry a paper and pen to record any anomalous behavior that you see, so that it can be reviewed at some later time. Exact times, names of people involved, and clear descriptions of events are important to this record. A sample log form is included in appendix E.

  1. Early Board Observer Guidelines

 

Early Boards are convened to log in the early ballot envelopes as they arrive from the signature confirmation process, remove the ballots from the envelopes (without looking at the votes on them), review them to determine if they will be readable by the scanners, set aside the ballots needing duplication, and package the readable ballots for transport to the central count scanning facility. There will be as many of these boards as needed to expeditiously process all the early ballots that are expected for the election.  Each board will include two members or different political parties. The board members will be paid by the election department for their service.

 

To gain admission to the facility where the Early Boards meet, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is to confirm that the process is done correctly and without any improper alteration of ballots, removal of valid ballots, or any insertion of fraudulent ballots into the process. None of these things is very likely, but all are possible.

 

Early Board members should not be wielding pencils or pens while handling ballots and you should question any such instances. A traditional method of invalidating ballots is for an Early Board member to surreptitiously put extra marks on a ballot so as to produce an overvote in a critical race.

 

Although the election department personnel will probably keep logs of ballot packages sent to the scanning facility, you should keep your own log of ballots packaged for transport to the central count scanning facility, to be compared later with logs kept by central count early ballot scanning observers to confirm that all packages of ballots prepared by the early boards arrive at the scanning facility and that no others do. Each package of ballots should be sealed with tamper-revealing tape (if a cardboard box, seals should be placed on the top and bottom of the box) or some other form of tamper-revealing seal. Your log should reflect the board number, the package number, the seal number(s), and the time the package was sealed.

 

At the end of each day’s work, some ballots will be unprocessed or partially processed. These should be placed in sealed containers and locked in a secure facility overnight. The entrance to the sealed facility should be protected by a tamper-revealing seal.

 

Problems should be brought to the attention of the person supervising the Early Boards. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, and a clear description of what you saw.

 

Sample Early Board Observer log form s are included in appendix E.


  1. Duplication Board Observer Guidelines

 

Most Duplication Boards are convened during the processing of early ballots, but one or more may be needed after the election to duplicate unreadable late arriving early ballots and early ballots and provisional ballots turned in at the polls that are rejected by the central count scanners. Duplication Boards work alongside Early or Provisional Boards, so you may find yourself observing both processes in the same room.

 

A Duplication Board consists of two people of different political parties who have been hired by the election department and are paid a stipend for their work. Their job is to find a blank ballot printed for the same precinct as a rejected ballot, copy all the votes from the rejected ballot to the blank ballot, mark both the rejected ballot and the new ballot with a serial number to connect them in the event of a challenge or recount, place the new ballot into a stack to be scanned, place the rejected ballot into a file of rejected ballots, and record the duplication in a log.

 

To gain admission to the facility where the Early Boards meet, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is simply to confirm that the Duplication Boards are doing their jobs correctly (they very probably will be doing so).

 

Duplication Board members could, if the two members were working in concert (or if one were not paying close attention to the other) mark a duplicate ballot differently from the original rejected ballot, or mark an unwarranted overvote on the duplicated ballot to negate its effect in a critical race, or create duplicate ballots without first having a rejected ballot to copy.

 

You should be aware that ballot scanning equipment is very sensitive and an overvote mark could be so small as to be almost undetectable by a human eye, as long as it is in the area where the scanner is expecting a vote mark.

 

The election department should be maintaining an inventory of blank ballots and you should confirm that such a process is being used and that proper logs are being kept.

 

If you identify problems, you should bring them to the attention of the person supervising the Duplication Boards. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, and a clear description of what you saw.

 

Sample Duplication Board Observer log forms are included in appendix E.

 

 

 

  1. Early Ballot Scanning Board Observer Guidelines

 

The Secretary of State’s Election Manual does not describe an early ballot scanning board, aside from the Accuracy Certification Board, which has in the past often not been on hand for all early ballot scanning. Early ballot scanning is done by election department personnel who remove ballots from containers received from the early ballot boards, scan the ballots into the central count computer, and return the ballots to their container. Because of the new (2006) requirement for hand-count audits and because the scanning equipment was not designed to segregate early ballots batch vote totals for auditing, it is necessary for the computer operator to print a vote total summary report before and after scanning a batch of ballots selected for possible. No one is supposed to read these reports before the end of Election Day and they should be sealed into envelopes marked in such a way that they can be reconnected with the batch of ballots when the audit begins.

 

To gain admission to the facility where the early ballot scanning is done, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is to confirm that the scanning is done correctly, and you will join other party observers in randomly selecting batches making up four percent of the early ballots for possible audit.

 

You should maintain a log of batches of ballots received from the early boards, their seal numbers, the time of scanning, new seal numbers placed on at least the audit batches, the name of the person operating the scanner and the scanner designation, and the person operating the computer. The seal numbers you record can be compared after the election with seal numbers recorded by observers of the early boards to ensure that all ballots processed by the early boards were scanned and that no others were.

 

You should observe carefully the activity at the printer, which should be in the same room with the scanners and the central count computer. Identify all printouts. No vote total summary reports should be printed other than the ones you specify for audit batches.

 

Whenever the party observers leave the central count room, everyone else should also leave the room and the room should be locked and sealed so that no one can enter until everyone does. Ideally the computer should also be sealed when you leave the room. Seals should be of the tamper-revealing type, and you should record all seal numbers placed and removed, and the time of each event. These can be compared with the computer event logs after the election.

 

If you identify problems, you should bring them to the attention of the person supervising the operation. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, and a clear description of what you saw.

 

Sample Early Ballot Scanning Observer log forms are included in appendix E.

 

 

  1. Receiving Board and Inspection Board Observer Guidelines

 

Every county will have at least one receiving facility to which two precinct judges of opposite parties from each precinct are required to return ballots and voting machines after the polls close on Election Day. Depending on the size of your county, your election department may set up one or more receiving stations in addition to the central facility and each precinct will be directed to return ballots and voting machines to a particular receiving facility.

 

At each receiving facility, there will be one or more Receiving Boards to check in the ballots and equipment. Each Board should include two people of different political parties. In the receiving center one or more Inspection Boards (also two people of different parties) will examine the equipment and ballot containers to confirm that seals are intact. An election department person might also be transmitting results to the central count facility for precincts from which results were not already successfully transmitted. The Receiving Board and Inspection Board functions may be combined in one or more Boards which both check in and examine equipment and ballots.

 

To gain admission to the receiving facility, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is to confirm that the Boards are performing their tasks correctly, to confirm that each precinct delivery is made by two judges of opposite parties, to record numbers of precincts delivering equipment and ballots, and to record any instances of equipment and ballot containers arriving with broken or missing seals.

 

If your receiving facility is a remote facility, ballots and voting machines must be transported from the remote facility at intervals to the central count facility. Arizona law requires that this transport include two escorts, one from each of the major parties. You should confirm that this process is working as required.

 

If you identify problems, you should bring them to the attention of the person supervising the operation. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, and a clear description of what you saw.

 

Sample Receiving/Inspection Board Observer log forms are included in appendix E.


 

  1. Provisional Board Observer Guidelines

 

After the election, signatures on provisional and conditional provisional ballot envelopes must be reviewed by the County Recorder’s office to determine if they represent valid registered voters. The validated envelopes are returned to the election department and Provisional Boards are convened to open the envelopes, to review the ballots to confirm that they will scan successfully, and to package the ballots for transport to the central count facility.

 

To gain admission to the facility where the Provisional Boards meet, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is to confirm that the process is done correctly and without any improper alteration of ballots, removal of valid ballots, or any insertion of fraudulent ballots into the process. None of these things is very likely, but all are possible.

 

Provisional Board members should not be wielding pencils or pens while handling ballots and you should question any such instances. A traditional method of invalidating ballots is for a board member to surreptitiously put extra marks on a ballot so as to produce an overvote in a critical race.

 

Although the election department personnel will probably keep logs of ballot packages sent to the scanning facility, you should keep your own log of ballots packaged for transport to the central count scanning facility, to be compared later with logs kept by central count observers to confirm that all packages of ballots prepared by the provisional boards arrive at the scanning facility and that no others do. Each package of ballots should be sealed with tamper-revealing tape (if a cardboard box, seals should be placed on the top and bottom of the box) or some other form of tamper-revealing seal. Your log should reflect the board number, the package number, the seal number(s), and the time the package was sealed.

 

If provisional ballot processing extends beyond one day, at the end of each day’s work some ballots may be unprocessed or partially processed. These should be placed in sealed containers and locked in a secure facility overnight. The entrance to the sealed facility should be protected by a tamper-revealing seal. You will want to log these seal numbers as well.

 

Problems should be brought to the attention of the person supervising the Provisional Boards. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, and a clear description of what you saw.

 

Sample Provisional Board Observer log forms are included in appendix E.

 

  1. Write-in Board Observer Guidelines

 

Ballots with write-in votes on them are diverted by precinct scanners to a separate compartment in the ballot collection box. Central count scanners also alert the operator to the presence of a ballot with a write-in vote on it. All these ballots are collected and delivered to one or more Write-In Boards, whose task is to first confirm that the write-in votes are for registered write-in candidates, and then to tally those write-in votes by hand. (All other votes on the ballot will have already been tallied by either the precinct voting machine or by the central count scanner.)

 

To gain admission to the facility where the Write-in Boards meet, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is to confirm that the process is done correctly and without any improper alteration of ballots, removal of valid ballots, or any insertion of fraudulent ballots into the process. None of these things is very likely, but all are possible.

 

If write-in tallying extends beyond one day, at the end of each day’s work counted and uncounted ballots should be placed in separate sealed containers and locked in a secure facility overnight. The entrance to the sealed facility should be protected by a tamper-revealing seal. You should log any seal numbers that you observe being removed or applied to any container or storage facility.

 

Problems should be brought to the attention of the person supervising the Write-in Boards. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, and a clear description of what you saw.

 

Sample Write-in Board Observer log forms are included in appendix E.

 

 


  1. Audit Board Observer Guidelines

 

The Audit Board receives reports from all the other central count boards and from the precincts, and compares vote counts and numbers of voters from precinct records with the results reported by the central count computer to verify the total vote count and the count for each race in each precinct. The board must at least compare the precinct ballot reports with the precinct totals tapes generated by the precinct voting machines, and may also examine precinct poll lists and signature rosters to resolve any discrepancies. The make-up of the Audit Board is not specified in the Secretary of State’s Election Manual but it does say that the work of the Audit Board must be done in the presence of political observers. The functions of the Audit Board must be completed before the acceptance of the results for the official canvass.

 

To gain admission to the facility where the Write-in Boards meet, you will need a letter of appointment signed by the County Party Chair. Your job as an observer is to confirm that the process is done completely and correctly – every precinct and race is to be reviewed, and both voter totals and vote totals must be consistent. Any discrepancies must be resolved. This is a tedious process, one that a lax Audit Board might be tempted to gloss over, but it is an important part of confirming the integrity of the election.

 

You should record on your log any discrepancies identified by the board, including the precinct number, a description of the discrepancy, and a description of the board’s resolution of the discrepancy.

 

Problems with the Audit Board should be brought to the attention of the person supervising the Audit Board. You should record any anomalous behavior in your log and bring it to the attention of the County Party Chair or your observer coordinator. Your record should include time, names of people involved, a clear description of the problem as you perceived it, and the response you got when you spoke with the person in charge.

 

Sample Audit Board Observer log forms are included in appendix E.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Appendix E: Sample Log Forms for Observers

 

Most observers need to report only anomalous behavior or activity, and may use the notes log for this purpose. The early board observers, early ballot scanning observers, receiving/inspection board observers, and audit board observers need to track regular activity of the boards they observe, so there are also particular log forms for their use. Both the particular board logs and the notes log have a column marked “Note ID” which may be used to link particular board log activity and notes regarding anomalous behavior or activity. Specific log forms recommended for use by observers of each board or early ballot scanning activity:

 

  1. Accuracy Certification Board Observers

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Early Board Observers

n     Early Board Activity Log

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Duplication Board Observers

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Early Ballot Scanning Observers

n     Early Ballot Scanning Log

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Receiving Board and Inspection Board Observers

n     Receiving Center Activity Log

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Provisional Board Observers

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Write-in Board Observers

n     Observer Notes Log

  1. Audit Board Observers

n     Audit Board Activity Log

n     Observer Notes Log


OBSERVER NOTES LOG

Observer

Date

Note ID

Time

Description of Problem, Activity, or Event

Board Resolution, Reaction, or Explanation

Observer Comments

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


EARLY BOARD ACTIVITY LOG

 

Date

 

 

 

 

 

Start Time

 

 

 

 

Observer

 

 

 

 

Security Seals Removed

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Batch

Board #

Box #

Box Seals Removed

Total

End

Box Seals Applied

Transport to Scan

Note

Top

Bottom

Ballots

Time

Top

Bottom

Date

Time

ID